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I.

INTRODUCTION

An appellate decision that rests upon inapposite authority, faulty
analysis, or unsound reasoning is hardly uncommon in American
law. When such a case promises to cause harm to important interests, however, academic analysis and criticism become imperative.
Such a case is Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics,' wherein the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held
that a West Virginia State Bar Association's disciplinary proceeding
against a United States attorney could be removed to federal district
2
court under the federal-officer removal statute.
The decision in Kolibash is best described as clearly erroneous.
The court's reliance upon authority, its legal and factual analysis,
and its application of law and policy to facts are riddled with errors.
The decision in the case, that the removal of the disciplinary proceeding satisfied statutory requirements, is thus without foundation.
If the Fourth Circuit's application of the law had been correct and
its reasoning sound, it would have been compelled to hold that the
United States Attorney's removal petition failed in several crucial
respects to satisfy the requirements of section 1442, and that the
district court's-decision to remand the proceeding to the state system
should be affirmed.

1. 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1982). For the pertinent provisions of the removal statute, see the text
accompanying note 9 infra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss3/2

2

FourthYCircuit's
Decision to Uphold Remova
ERRONEOUS
1990] D.: Clearly Erroneous: The
CLEARL

This case deserves comment and analysis because it has unjustifiably harmed the legitimate interests of the state of West Virginia
in that it has allowed a federal district court, without congressional
authorization, to deprive a state supreme court and bar association
of their rightful authority to regulate attorney misconduct and membership of the state bar. This case also creates a dangerous precedent
that threatens to lend the semblance of legitimacy to other efforts
to promote unwarranted federal intrusion into an area that has traditionally been and should remain the exclusive province of the states.
This article will identify the major flaws and deficiencies of the
Kolibash opinion and will show that the case places vital and wellestablished principles of federalism in jeopardy. The article's main
thesis is that the decision should be overruled.
The facts of the case are as follows. It began when an individual
who had been convicted of federal drug charges complained to the
West Virginia State Bar Association that an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northern District of West Virginia had engaged in
professional misconduct while prosecuting the government's case
against him. In particular, the individual alleged that the prosecutor
had first represented the defendant as a private attorney during a
federal grand-jury investigation and then, after joining the United
States Attorney's office, had participated in the case on the government's side by questioning witnesses before the grand jury. After
the defendant was convicted, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment on the
of inground that the Assistant United States Attorney's conflict
3
rights.
due-process
defendant's
the
terest had violated
While investigating the prosecutor's conduct, the bar association
expanded its inquiry to include his supervisor, William A. Kolibash,
the United States Attorney for the Northern District of West Virginia. On April 30, 1987, the state bar's Committee on Legal Ethics
formally accused Kolibash of violating its Code of Professional

3. United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 565-66 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098
(1986).
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Responsibiity4 by failing to supervise his associate adequately and
by failing to disclose relevant information to the trial court during
its investigation of the conflict-of-interest charges. Kolibash insisted
that he had done nothing improper and that he had instructed his
colleague to isolate himself from cases involving persons whom he
had previously represented.
On May 6, 1987, Kolibash petitioned to remove the state-bar
disciplinary proceeding to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. The
Committee on Legal Ethics then filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447,- asking the district court to remand the proceeding to the
state system on the ground that it was removed improvidently and
without jurisdiction. On April 21, 1988, the district court remanded
the proceeding, stating that the licensure of attorneys was basically
a state function and that the charges against Kolibash would be
adjudicated fairly in the state system. Kolibash then appealed the
remand order to the Fourth Circuit. In an opinion by Judge Wilkinson, a three-judge panel of the court of appeals held that removal
of the proceeding satisfied the requirements of section 1442, and
that the district court had erred by divesting itself of jurisdiction
over the case. 6
Before reaching the merits of Kolibash's appeal, the Fourth Circuit had to interpret and apply the federal statute governing the
reviewability on appeal or otherwise of district-court orders remanding removed cases to state courts. At that time, the statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1447, provided in pertinent part:
4. -CODE OF PRoFmssIoNAL REsPONsmmrIy (1978). The Code that was in effect at the time of
Kolibash's alleged misconduct can be found in the Court Rules volume of the WEsT VmosXA CODE
(1982) at page 281. It was adopted and promulgated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

on June 9, 1970, became effective on July 1, 1970, and was amended in 1977 and 1978. On January
1, 1989, the Code was superseded and replaced by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which was
adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals on June 30, 1988.

5. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982). For the pertinent provisions of the statute, see the text accompanying note 7 infra.
6. The facts of the case are summarized by the court of appeals in Kolibash, 872 F.2d at
572. Although charges of professional misconduct formed the basis for the Kolibash decision, this
article neither expresses nor implies any opinion as to whether William A. Kolibash or any other

attorney in the office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of West Virginia did
in fact violate the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.
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(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case
.... The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise ....7

As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the purpose of
these provisions is "to prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases

by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues."" By permitting appellate review of the remand order in Kolibash, the Fourth Circuit

ran afoul of this congressional purpose.
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which the court applied
when deciding the case on its merits, provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any
of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under
him, for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or
authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment
9
of criminals or the collection of the revenue.

Acting under the authority of the constitutional doctrine of federal

supremacy, 10 Congress enacted this statute and its predecessors " 'to
provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise
defenses arising from their official duties ... [and] to protect federal

officers from interference by hostile state courts.' "I'The federal2
government, as the Supreme Court first said over a century ago'
and has recently reiterated,
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982). Subsection (c) was amended November 19, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-702, Title X, § 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4670 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West
Supp. 1989)), and now provides: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."
8. Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976). See also United States
v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946) (when enacting removal statutes that preceded section 1442, Congress
"den[ied] any form of review of an order of remand" in order to "establishl] the policy of not
permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed cause by prolonged litigation of
questions of jurisdiction . . ").
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1982).
10. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969).
11. Mesa v. California, 109 S.Ct. 959, 969 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Willingham, 395
U.S. at 405).
12. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880).
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can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act within the States.

If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their authority, those officers can
be arrested and brought to trial in a State court, for an alleged offense against
the law of the State, yet warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if
the general government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection,if their protection must be left to the action of the State court,-the operations
of the general government may at any time be arrested at the will of one of its
members.' 3

"The act of removal permits a trial upon the merits of the statelaw question free from local interests or prejudice.' 14
Federal-officer removal "was first invoked in times of crisis and
thereafter always limited to special situations deemed to present special needs."1 5 The earliest removal statutes were designed to protect
federal officers charged with carrying out federal laws strongly opposed by state and local authorities in one region of the country or
another. 16
For example, in reaction to New England's opposition to the
trade embargo declared during the War of 1812, Congress in 1815

enacted a statute, limited in duration, providing for the removal to
federal court of any state prosecution or civil lawsuit brought against
federal customs officials because of their collection of customs duties. 17 Another example occurred in 1833, when South Carolina sought
to nullify federal customs laws by making their enforcement a state
crime, and Congress reacted by enacting a permanent version of the
earlier removal provision. I8 Congress subsequently passed a series of
13. Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 963 (quoting Davis, 100 U.S. at 263).
14. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1981) (citations omitted).
15. P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. M1SEmcN & D. SHAPIRo, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTmM 1057 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER].
16. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-06 (1969); California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960,
964 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989); HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 1057-59;
Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutionsAffecting Federally GuaranteedCivil Rights: FederalRemoval and
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 793, 805-10 (1965);
Strayhorn, The Immunity of Federal Officers from State Prosecutions, 6 N.C.L. REv. 123, 129-33
(1927); Note, Removal of Suits AgainstFederalOfficers: Does the MalfeasantMailman Merit a Federal
Forum?, 88 CoLum. L. Ray. 1098, 1099-1100 (1988).
17. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405 (1969);
HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 1057-58; Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 806; Strayhorn, supra
note 16, at 130; Note, supra note 16, at 1099.
18. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 633. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405; HART
AND WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 1058; Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 806-07; Strayhorn, supra note
16, at 129-30; Note, supra note 16, at 1099.
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measures granting the right of removal to other federal officers, 19
including internal-revenue agents, 20 members of Congress, 2' and Prohibition agents.22 In 1948 Congress finally adopted the fully general
language now contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which extends
the right of removal to all federal officers:3 While the scope of the
removal statutes was expanding, their purpose remained constant:
to allow removal, not whenever a state action is brought against a
federal officer, but only when the enforcement of a substantive federal law or policy is challenged by the authority of a state. 2A "Congress has been careful not to interfere with the rights of the states,
except along the lines where past experience has pointed out the

necessity.'

'25

Because no credible threat of state interference with the exercise
of federal authority was posed in Kolibash, the decision in the case
cannot be reconciled with the purposes that Congress and the courts
have understood the federal-officer removal statutes have served since
1815.
In Kolibash the court of appeals faced three specific issues of
statutory interpretation. The first, discussed briefly by the court, is
whether the provision of section 1447(d), which states that a district
court order remanding a case to the state court "is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise," barred review of the remand order by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.2 6 The court held that it
did not. 27 The second issue, discussed at some length by the court,
is whether the state-bar disciplinary proceeding was commenced
against Kolibash for acts performed "under color" of his federal

19. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405-06; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 1058-59;
Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 808-10; Strayhorn, supra note 16, at 130-33; Note, supra note 16, at
1099-1100.
20. Act of Mar. 7, 1864, ch. 20, § 9, 13 Stat. 14, 17.
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 130, § 8, 18 Stat. 371, 401.
22. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, § 28, 41 Stat. 305, 307, 316.
23. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1442, 62 Stat. 869, 938. See Willingham, 395 U.S. at
406; Note, supra note 16, at 1100.
24. See Note, supra note 16, at 1099.
25. Strayhorn, supra note 16, at 129.
26. 872 F.2d at 573.
27. Id.
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office, within the meaning of section 1442(a)(1). 21 The court concluded that it was. 29 The third statutory issue, also discussed briefly,
is whether the disciplinary proceeding was a "civil action or criminal
prosecution commenced in a State court," within the meaning of
section 1442(a).30 The court held that it was. 31 As this article tries
to show, each of these conclusions is invalid because it is in conflict
with congressional intentions and with judicial interpretations of the
statutes in question.
The most glaring deficiency of the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Kolibash is that it cannot be squared with either the holding or the
reasoning of the Supreme Court's most recent decision interpreting
the federal-officer removal statute, Mesa v. California.32 Decided
just two weeks before Kolibash, Mesa considered the issue of whether
petitioners, mail-truck drivers employed by the United States Postal
Service, could remove to federal district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1). 33 The case involved state criminal prosecutions for misdemeanor manslaughter and speeding, which had arisen out of traffic accidents that occurred while they were performing their duties
as postal employees.3 4 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, a unanimous Supreme Court held that "[flederal officer removal under 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a) must be predicated on averment of a federal defense. ' ' 35 The truck drivers, the Court said, could not remove their
cases because it was not possible for them to aver federal defenses
36
to the state prosecutions.
The Mesa Court's holding, which reaffirms "an unbroken line
of ...

decisions extending back nearly a century and a quarter, 3 7

rests upon three distinct but related considerations that have long
formed the Court's interpretation of the congressional intentions
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 574-76.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
Id. at 691-92.
Id.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 967.
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underlying the federal-officer removal statutes. The first and most
general consideration is that federal-officer removal is only warranted in cases presenting a federal question that must be decided
in a federal forum to ensure the protection of important federal
interests .38 The second consideration is that removal is not warranted
where the purpose served by the action sought to be removed is
highly important to the state, and the state interest in deciding the
39
matter in the state courts outweighs the federal interest in removal.
The third consideration is that a mere possibility of state hostility
to federal authority, without any showing or allegation of such hostility, is insufficient to support removal. 4°
Judge Wilkinson's opinion in Kolibash is fatally flawed in that
it fails to appreciate that the facts of the case do not satisfy the
rule reaffirmed in Mesa. United States Attorney Kolibash neither
did, nor could aver a federal defense of official immunity or any
other federal defense to the charges filed against him by the West
Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics. In addition, the opinion fails to recognize that the reasoning that supports the Supreme
Court's holding in Mesa is equally applicable in Kolibash. In Kolibash, as in Mesa, no appreciable federal interest was served by
removal, the case implicated important state rather than federal interests, and the federal officer failed to make any showing or even
allegation of state hostility to federal authority. Thus, if the Fourth
Circuit had applied the holding and the policy underpinnings of
Mesa carefully in Kolibash, it would have held that a state-bar disciplinary proceeding brought against a United States Attorney, like
the state criminal prosecutions at issue in Mesa, cannot be removed
to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442.

II.

THE LACK OF LEGAL GROUNDS FORITHE KOLIBASH DECISION

A. The Unreviewability on Appeal of the District Court's
Remand Order
The West Virginia State Bar argued in Kolibash that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d), which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the
38. See id. at 969-70.
39. See id. at 969.
40. See id. at 969-70.
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State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise," meant what it said and barred review of the remand

order by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 4' Despite the
facial breadth and absoluteness of the statutory prohibition, the court
of appeals rejected the argument and refused to dismiss Kolibash's
appeal. Its reasoning was as follows:
Section 1447(d) does not bar review in all cases. See Thermtron Products,
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976). Sections 1447(c) and 1447(d) are in
pari materia and are to be construed accordingly. A remand order is therefore
immune from review only if it invokes the grounds specified in § 1447(c)-i.e.,
"that removal was improvident and without jurisdiction." Id. at 345-46.
Although a district court is not required to invoke the specific language of
§ 1447(c), the court's failure in this case to pose the propriety of remand in the
terms of the statute is a factor in determining whether its order is reviewable.
Here, the district court did not apply the § 1447 standard. It focused instead on
the state interest in regulating and policing professional misconduct. This consideration, however, is not dispositive in determining whether the state disciplinary
proceeding was improvidently removed under the federal officer removal statute.
The remand order represented a discretionary decision by the district court not
to hear a certain case on grounds of public policy and is therefore reviewable on
appeal. As the Supreme Court recognized in Thermtron, Congress did not intend
"to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal
statutes governing removal by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable
to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute." 423 U.S. at
2

351.4

The court is correct to say that section 1447(d), as interpreted by

the United States Supreme Court in Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer,43 does not bar review in all cases. But the Fourth Cir-

cuit's analysis is inconsistent with the facts of the case. The
inconsistency appears based on the court's assertion that the statute

does not preclude review in Kolibash because "the district court did
not apply the § 1447 standard" when it remanded the Kolibash
disciplinary proceeding and instead reached a "discretionary decision" "not to hear [the] case on grounds of public policy."
Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer involved a properly removed diversity case remanded to the state court by the United
41. 872 F.2d at 573.
42. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336
(1976)).
43. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
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States District Court, not on statutory grounds, but on the plainly
non-statutory ground that the district court's docket was too crowded

to permit a trial of the case within the foreseeable future. 44 The issue
in the case was "whether § 1447(d) . .. bars review where a case
has been properly removed and the remand order is issued on grounds
not authorized by § 1447(c). ' 45 The Supreme Court said:
[R]espondent [the district judge] did not purport to proceed on the basis that this
case had been removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction." Neither the
propriety of the removal nor the jurisdiction of the court was questioned by
respondent in the slightest .... Instead, the District Court's order was based on
grounds wholly different from those upon which § 1447(c) permits remand. The
determining factor was the District Court's heavy docket .... This consideration
... is plainly irrelevant ... to the question whether this cause was removed
"improvidently and without jurisdiction" ....
... The District Court exceeded its authority in remanding on grounds not
permitted by the controlling statute.
...Section 1447(d) is not dispositive of the reviewability of remand orders
in and of itself. That section and § 1447(c) must be construed together ....
These provisions . . . "are in pari materia [and] are to be construed accordingly
rather than as distinct enactments .... ." This means that only remand orders
issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein-that removal
was improvident and without jurisdiction-are immune from review under §
1447(d).-

As interpreted in Thermtron, section 1447(d) is an absolute bar to
all forms of appellate review of a district court's remand order if
the order was "issued on the grounds specified in § 1447(c)." But

if the order was based upon "grounds not specified in the statute
and not touching the propriety of the removal," review is available.47

The reviewability of the remand order in Kolibash thus turns on
whether the order was based on a non-statutory ground or on one
of the statutory grounds, lack of jurisdiction or improvident removal.

In the passage from Kolibash quoted above, the Fourth Circuit
asserts that the remand order in Kolibash is analogous to the one

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

339.
343.
343-44, 345-46 (footnotes and citations omitted).
351, 352.
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in Thermtron in that it was grounded in non-statutory considerations
of "public policy." As is typical of the Kolibash opinion, the court's
statements on this issue are for the most part conclusory and unsupported by analysis. Even if the court had elaborated upon its
reasoning, however, it seems doubtful that it would have been able
to justify its characterization of the grounds for the remand order.
Admittedly, the memorandum opinion of United States District
Judge Knapp in In re Kolibash4 does not explicitly invoke 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) or its language as the basis for the remand. As the Fourth
Circuit concedes in Kolibash,49 however, the Supreme Court decided

in Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 50 that a remand order
may be reviewable even though it makes no reference to that section
or its language. 51 In Gravitt the district court, describing the case
as "improperly removed," had remanded a state tort action because
of a lack of complete diversity of citizenship among the parties.5 2
The Supreme Court looked to the nature of the grounds of the
remand rather than to the language used by the district court and
found the grounds to be jurisdictional and thus "plainly within the
bounds of § 1447(c). ' ' 53 Although the Fourth Circuit asserts in Kolibash that "the court's failure in this case to pose the propriety of
remand in the terms of the statute is a factor in determining whether
its order is reviewable, ' 54 Gravitt makes clear that the issue in cases
like Kolibash is not whether the district court invoked the specific
language of section 1447(c) but whether the grounds of the remand
were jurisdictional in nature.
Regrettably, Judge Knapp's opinion does not clearly and pre-

cisely articulate the grounds of the remand. Although Kolibash appears to be the only case yet decided by the Fourth Circuit in which
the grounds of the remand are not clearly identified, Thermtron and
Gravitt clearly imply, and other courts of appeals have held, that
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Civ. Act. No. 2:87-0444 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 20, 1988).
872 F.2d at 573.
430 U.S. 723 (1977) (per curiam).
Id. at 723-24.
Id.
Id. at 723.
872 F.2d at 573.
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when called upon to review the remand order in such a case, the

appellate court should make its determination of reviewability on
the basis of the grounds that were actually in the judge's mind when
he or she remanded the case, as indicated by the judge's language

and any other available evidence.
For example, Kunzi v. Pan American World Airways 5- decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is similar to Kolibash

in that the district court had remanded a removed case without specifying the grounds for doing so. 5 6 The court of appeals reviewed the
entire record and found evidence of the grounds in the form of
various statements by the district judge, one of which (from the
remand order) expressed doubts as to "'whether removal of any of

the action at bar was proper,'" and another of which (from a hearing) expressed doubts as to whether the court had "'subject matter
jurisdiction over the entire case.' 57The Ninth Circuit concluded:
A common-sense reading ... would indicate that [a concern about a lack of
jurisdiction] was implicit in the court's references-in both of the transcripts and
the remand order-regarding whether removal was proper. This is the only sensible
reading since jurisdictional concerns were the sole basis for the court's initial
questioning of the propriety of removal. Considering the entire record, ... it is
apparent the district court concluded that... it lacked jurisdiction over the entire
case. [W]e find that this is a jurisdictional determination that falls within section
1447(c), and is thus unreviewableA'

Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's unsupported assertion that

the remand order in Kolibash "represented a discretionary decision
by the district court not to hear [the] case on grounds of public
55. 833 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987).
56. Id. at 1293.
57. Id. at 1293-94 (emphasis omitted).
58. Id. at 1294 (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit resolved uncertainty surrounding the grounds of a remand in a similar way in In re Weaver, 610 F.2d 335 (5th
Cir. 1980). In that case "the district court did not refer to § 1447(c), nor did it mention the phrase
'removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.' It merely concluded that removal, if it had been
proper at all, was no longer available after petitioners had sought the dissolution of the injunction
in state court." Id. at 337. The court of appeals held:
Even though the specific language of § 1447(c) was not used, it seems apparent that at the
time of the remand order, Judge Edenfield believed the case was not removable, leading
to the logical inference that he felt jurisdiction was lacking. Such a holding is within the
guidelines of § 1447(c).
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policy," 59 the district court's opinion in In re Kolibash in fact contains clear indications that the remand was actually based, not on
public-policy grounds, but rather on jurisdictional grounds and was
thus within the scope of section 1447(c). The clearest and most unambiguous indication of the jurisdictional basis of the remand is
Judge Knapp's statement near the end of his opinion that "there
would appear to be no specific right conferred on the parties herein
charged by the statute in question that would require an adjudication
of the proceeding authorized by the law of this state in a federal
court." 60 If the judge had understood the federal-officer removal
statute to grant jurisdiction over the Kolibash disciplinary proceeding
to the United States District Court, as the Fourth Circuit claims,
he certainly would not have made this statement. A removal statute
can only create federal jurisdiction over a particular action by authorizing the defendant in the action to remove it from state to
federal court, that is, by conferring a right upon the defendant to
have the matter resolved in a federal court. Indeed, that is the
"motivating concern" of the removal statutes-to "grant a right to
a federal forum" when necessary "to protect litigants against local
prejudice, influence, and discrimination.''61
To say, as Judge Knapp does, that the removal statute confers
no right upon Kolibash that would require adjudication of the disciplinary proceeding in a federal court is to say clearly and unambiguously that the statute does not authorize removal of the
proceeding, that is, that "the case was removed improvidently and
without jurisdiction." 62 Thus, as in Kunzi v. Pan American World
Airways,63 "the only sensible reading" of the remand order in Kolibash understands the grounds of the remand to be within the scope
of section 1447(c). It follows that section 1447(d) barred appellate
review of the remand, and that the Fourth Circuit erred by refusing
to dismiss Kolibash's appeal.

59. 872 F.2d at 573.

60. In re Kolibash, Civ. Act. No. 2:87-0444, mem. op. at 5 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 20, 1988)
(emphasis
61.
62.
63.

added).
Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1989).
In re Kolibash, Civ. Act. No. 2:87-0444, mem. op. at 5 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 20, 1988).
833 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1987). See text at note 57 supra.
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Although somewhat ambiguous, the other considerations cited
by Judge Knapp as grounds for his decision to remand the proceeding are fully consistent with this interpretation of the remand
order. One of the grounds identified by the judge is that "licensure
of professionals is basically a state function." The Fourth Circuit
correctly stated that "[t]his consideration . .. is not dispositive in
determining whether the state disciplinary proceeding was improvidently removed, ' 65 but it does not follow that the consideration is
"plainly irrelevant," like the grounds for the remand in Thermtron,
to the issue of jurisdiction.6 6 In fact, as the Supreme Court's opinion
in Mesa v. California67 shows, the degree to which the regulation
of a particular activity has traditionally been within the province of
the states or implicates important state interests is an important factor in the determination of whether proceedings that arise out of
68
that kind of regulation are removable to federal court.
Thus, in stating that the licensure of professionals is basically a
state function, Judge Knapp may well have meant to identify a consideration that supports the conclusion (though it is not, as the Fourth
Circuit notes, "dispositive" of the issue) that section 1442 does not
grant federal jurisdiction over a disciplinary proceeding brought by
a state bar association to determine a United States Attorney's fitness to remain a member of the state bar. Moreover, this interpretation of the remand order is more plausible than the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation, which suggests that Judge Knapp's statement on the licensure of professionals identifies a purely discretionary policy ground for remanding the proceeding. The reason is
that the jurisdictional interpretation, unlike the policy interpretation,
is not inconsistent with the trial judge's statement that the removal
statute conferred no right upon Kolibash to have his disciplinary
proceeding adjudicated in a federal court.
Judge Knapp's remand order also contains the following passage:

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

In re Kolibash, mem. op. at 4.
872 F.2d at 573.
Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976).
109 S. Ct. 959, 969-70 (1989).
See infra notes 165-91 and accompanying text.
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State bar members who serve as federal officials are no less subject to the
requirements of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrrY that is the cornerstone
of licensure to practice the profession in this state. Indeed the local court rules
of the United States District courts ... make membership in the West Virginia
State Bar a requirement for practice before these courts. This prerequisite carries
with it the obligation to observe the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY imposed on all members and subjects that member to any disciplinary action provided by the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar.69

This passage is also ambiguous but can be fairly interpreted as an
affirmation of a jurisdictional ground for remanding the Kolibash

disciplinary proceeding to the West Virginia system. Under that interpretation, the meaning of the passage might be rendered as follows:
All members of the state bar, including those who serve as United States Attorneys, are required to adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
order to enforce this requirement and to ensure that only those persons who are
ethically fit remain members of the bar, the state supreme court, acting through
the state bar association, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings brought
against attorneys for the purpose of determining their ethical fitness. Moreover,
in order to ensure the integrity of the state bar, on which the integrity of the
federal bar depends, the state supreme court's jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings is inherent and permanent and cannot be transferred to the federal district
court pursuant to the federal-officer removal statute.

Once again, since this jurisdictional interpretation accommodates not
only the language of the quoted passage itself but the rest of Judge
Knapp's opinion as well, it is more plausible than the Fourth Circuit's public-policy interpretation, which is inconsistent with some
of the language of the district court's opinion.
The conclusion that the grounds of the remand in Kolibash were
jurisdictional is further supported by what Judge Knapp's opinion

does not contain. If the Fourth Circuit were correct to interpret the
remand decision as "a discretionary decision by the district court
not to hear [the] case on grounds of public policy, '

70

we would

expect Judge Knapp's opinion to contain some indication that, in
his view, the Kolibash disciplinary proceeding was within the district

court's "jurisdictional power," and that remanding the case was not
69. In re Kolibash, Civ. Act. No. 2:87-0444, mem. op. at 4-5 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 20, 1988).
70. 872 F.2d at 573.
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mandatory but merely desirable because it "would be better heard
in state court." 71 But no such indications are to be found. On the
contrary, unlike the district court opinion in Thermtron Products
v. Hermansdorfer, which did not question "the propriety of the
removal," 72 Judge Knapp's opinion implies that removal of the Kolibash proceeding was improper because it deprived the state supreme
court and the state bar of their authority to regulate the licensure
of members of the legal profession.
As interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
73
Fifth Circuit in In re Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
Thermtron "announced only a narrow rule that was intended to be
limited to the extreme facts of that case." 74 "[I]t appears," said the
Fifth Circuit, "that Thermtron was intended to be strictly limited
to those cases in which a district judge has actually stated that he
is not relying on § 1447(c) in ordering a remand." 75 As evidence
supporting this interpretation of the case, the court cites the fact
that "[t]he Thermtron Court never stated that it was willing to construe the seemingly-absolute bar of § 1447(c) as extending beyond
the exceptional facts of that case" and also the fact that in Gravitt
the Court "specifically refused to extend Thermtron" "to permit
appellate courts to correct remand orders that are plainly incorrect
' 76
on their face.
Several other courts of appeals have also construed Thermtron
narrowly. 77 In addition, leading academic authorities have expressed
the view that "[t]he exception recognized in Thermtron is quite nar-

71. Scott v. Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190, 827 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir.
1987).
72. 423 U.S. 336, 343-44 (1976).
73. 587 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. Id. at 647.
75. Id. at 648. Accord Division of Archives, History and
Records Management v. Austin, 729 F.2d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.
1984); In re Weaver, 610 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. 587 F.2d at 647-48.
77. See, e.g., Nasuti v. Scannell, 792 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1986) (Thermtron carves out a
"very narrow exception" to the section 1447(d) ban on review of remand orders.); General Elec. Co.
v. Byrne, 611 F.2d 670, 672 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("very limited exception"); Midland
Mortgage Co. v. Winner, 532 F.2d 1342, 1344 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("narrow execption").
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row and probably limited in application to unusual situations, such
as that presented in that case.' '78
Since the district court in Kolibash did not expressly invoke nonstatutory grounds as the basis for its remand of the disciplinary
proceeding, it is clear that, as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit,
Thermtron provides no support for the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Kolibash. On the contrary, if the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
Thermtron is correct, then Kolibash is plainly erroneous because the
facts of the case do not fall within the narrow exception to the
statutory prohibition of appellate review carved out by the United
States Supreme Court.
B. The "Under Color of Office" Requirement and the
Averment of a FederalDefense: The Insufficiency of the
Pleadings
After deciding that the remand order in Kolibash was reviewable,
the Fourth Circuit moved on to the question of whether the district
court was correct to remand the disciplinary proceeding to the West
Virginia system. The West Virginia State Bar argued that removal
was improvident and without jurisdiction, and that the district court
therefore had proper grounds on which to divest itself of jurisdiction. But the court of appeals disagreed, holding that all of the
requirements of section 1442 were satisfied. 79 The second specific
issue of statutory interpretation considered by the court, and the
one with which it is mainly concerned in its opinion, is whether the
disciplinary proceeding was brought against Kolibash for an act performed "under color" of his federal office, within the meaning of
section 1442(a)(1). Judge Wilkinson's opinion acknowledges that, as

78. 14A C. WIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3740, at 595-96 (1985). Another commentator has noted that

in Thermtron the Court ... stated the exception in narrow terms, allowing review only
because the district court did not even 'purport' to proceed on the basis of 1447(c) and
because the district court remanded on grounds that were 'wholly different' [from] and
'plainly irrelevant' to the provisions of section 1447(c) ....
Note, Remand Order Review After Thermtron Products, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1086, 1104 (footnote
omitted).

79. 872 F.2d at 572.
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interpreted in Mesa v. California,80 the statutory phrase "for any
act under color of ... office" 81 means "whenever a federal defense

can be alleged by the federal officer seeking removal.''82 After a
brief examination of Kolibash's pleadings, the court concluded that

he did satisfactorily aver a federal defense of official immunity to
the disciplinary proceeding.83 But the court's conclusion is supported

neither by facts nor by law.
The court set forth its reasoning and its conclusion in the following passage:
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) generally requires the specific averment of a
federal defense, the Supreme Court has explicitly left unresolved the question of
whether "careful pleading, demonstrating the close connection between the state
prosecution and the federal officer's performance of his duty, might adequately
replace the specific averment of a federal defense." In such circumstances, pleading by traverse may warrant removal. We think that this is such a case.
In his removal petition, for example, Kolibash demonstrates that his alleged
misconduct grew out of acts performed by him in the course of his duties as a
[T]he State Bar's charges arose out of Kolibash's alleged
federal officer ....
negligent supervision of one of his subordinates, which occurred while Kolibash
was acting in his capacity as the United States Attorney for the Northern District
of West Virginia. In his answer to the State Bar's charges, Kolibash denied that
any misconduct occurred. We believe that such pleading is akin to pleading a
defense of immunity and that, in any event, the more liberal pleading requirements
noted in Mesa are particularly well suited to the circumstances of this case. 1

In this passage, and in its later statement that

"

'it is the state's

power to subject federal officers to the state's process that
§ 1442(a)(1) curbs,' "85 the Kolibash court appears to imply that

despite invoking the stricter federal-defense interpretation, it favors
a more liberal interpretation of the "under color of office" requirement that permits removal whenever a federal officer is sub-

jected to state process " 'for the manner in which he has performed
his federal duties.' ",86 But it is well settled that the federal-officer
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
1986)).
86.

109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982).
872 F.2d at 574 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 966).
872 F.2d at 576 (quoting Nationwide Investors v. Miller, 793 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir.
Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 962 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 8).
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removal statute is not to be construed so expansively.8 7 In Mesa,
the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed a long line of previous
decisions by explicitly rejecting the broad interpretation of section
1442 that the Fourth Circuit appears to embrace in Kolibash.8 If
Kolibash does in fact rest upon such an interpretation of the statute,
the decision is plainly incorrect.
The passage quoted above, in which the Fourth Circuit evaluates
Kolibash's pleadings, appears to contain two distinct conclusions.
The first is that Kolibash did in fact satisfactorily plead the federal
defense of official immunity; the second is that, even if he did not
do so, his pleadings were nevertheless sufficient to satisfy section
1442 because they satisfied the "careful pleading" dictum in Mesa.
Once again, the court fails to explain adequately the reasoning by
which it arrives at its conclusions. Even if it had done so, however,
it is unlikely it could have demonstrated that either conclusion is
warranted.

87. See, e.g., Michigan v. Banning, 88 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1950). The Banning court
said:
It appears to this court that defendants labor under the impression that since admittedly
they are federal employees all they must do is to so state and to add to their petitions for
removal that allacts done by them were done under color of their federal office; that then
the case is automatically removed to this court.
This ... is not true under . . . § 1442 of Title 28 U.S.C.A .... [A]pplication of the
law is ... limited to those acts done by those employees "under color of such office."
Furthermore, this fact must affirmatively appear, not alone by a broad statement in the
petition to that effect, but by direct averments which must exclude possibility that any of
their alleged acts was not justified by their federal duty.
Id. at 450 (citations omitted). See also Mesa, 109 S. Ct. 959. The Mesa court stated the opposing
views and concluded as follows:
We granted the United States' petition for certiorari ... to resolve a conflict among the
Courts of Appeals concerning the proper interpretation of sec. 1442(a)(1)....
... The United States, largely adopting the view taken by the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 618 F.2d 246 (1980), would read "under
color of office" to permit removal "whenever a federal official is prosecuted for the manner
in which he has performed his federal duties .... ." Brief for Petitioners 8. California,
following the Court of Appeals below, would have us read the same phrase to impose a
requirement that some federal defense be alleged by the federal officer seeking removal.
... Federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) must be predicated upon averment of a federal defense.
Id. at 969-70.
88. 109 S. Ct. at 962, 970.
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Consider first the court's second conclusion. Even under the
"more liberal pleading requirements" to which the Mesa Court refers in dictum, Kolibash's pleadings had to "demonstrat[e] the close
connection between the state prosecution and the federal officer's
performance of his duty" in order to satisfy the "under color of
office" requirement.8 9 The court of appeals assumes that the pleadings did in fact demonstrate this connection, but the assumption is
unwarranted. As Justice O'Connor noted in Mesa, the Supreme Court
first suggested that pleadings demonstrating such a connection "might
adequately replace the specific averment of a federal defense'' 9° in
the earlier case of Maryland v. Soper (No. 1),91 the continuing validity of which the Court has recently affirmed. 92 The Court has
made it clear, however, that neither Soper (No. 1), Mesa, nor any
other decision has "eliminated the general requirement that federal
officer removal be predicated on the existence of a federal defense." 93 This means that even though a federal officer may not
have to plead a federal defense specifically in order to satisfy the
removal statute, he or she does have to plead specific facts showing
that a federal defense exists.
The United States Supreme Court indicated in Soper (No. 1) what
kinds of facts must be pleaded in order for this requirement to be
satisfied:
There must be a causal connection between what the officer has done under
asserted official authority and the state prosecution. It must appear that the pros-

ecution of him, for whatever offense, has arisen out of the acts done by him
under color of federal authority and in enforcement of federal law, and he must
by direct averment exclude the possibility that it was based on acts or conduct
of his, not justified by his federal duty.
[The] averments [in this case] amount to hardly more than to say that the
homicide on account of which [the federal officers] are charged with murder was
at a time when they were engaged in performing their official duties. They do

not negative the possibility that they were doing other acts than official acts at
the time ...

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

or make it clear andspecific that whatever was done by them leading

Id. at 966.
Id.
270 U.S. 9 (1926).
See Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 965-67.
Id. at 966, 970.
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to the prosecution was done under color of their federal official duty."

The Court elaborated further upon the pleading requirements in the
later case of Colorado v. Symes:
[T]he petition before us

. . .does not measure up to the required standard....
.. [It is] not calculated to give specific information as to the details of the

occurrence. The statements of the petition are so vague, indefinite and uncertain
as not to commit petitioner in respect of essential details of the defense he claims.
They are not sufficient to enable the court to determine whether his claim of
immunity rests on any substantial basis or is made in good faith.9

Thus, in order to "demonstrat[e] the close connection between
the state prosecution and the federal officer's performance of his
duty," as required by the "careful pleading" dictum of Mesa, Kolibash would have had to plead "the details of the occurrence,"
facts that made it "clear and specific," even if he did not specifically
aver, that he had a federal defense to the ethics charges brought
against him-facts that made it clear and specific, that is to say,
that state ethics charges were filed against him as a consequence of
acts that he had a federal duty to perform and not as a consequence
of acts outside the scope of his federal duties. But Kolibash's pleadings were not nearly detailed or specific enough to satisfy these requirements. As the court noted in Kolibash, the pleadings made only
the general claims that Kolibash's alleged misconduct grew out of
acts performed by him in the course of his federal duties, and that
he had not engaged in any misconduct.9 6 The court's second conclusion, that Kolibash's pleadings were sufficient to satisfy the
"careful pleading" dictum of Mesa, is thus unwarranted.
Moreover, Maryland v. Soper (No. 1) clearly shows that the
Fourth Circuit's first conclusion, that Kolibash satisfactorily pleaded
the federal defense of immunity, is also insupportable. Although the
Supreme Court's decision in Soper (No. 1) "assumed that a situation
could arise in which a petition that pleaded by traverse might warrant removal, ' 97 the Court in that case also rejected pleadings that

94.
95.
96.
97.

270 U.S. at 33, 35 (emphasis added).
286 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1932) (emphasis added).
872 F.2d at 574.
Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 966.
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were analogous in both form and content to those of Kolibash.
Soper (No. 1) involved federal Prohibition agents who sought to
remove a state murder prosecution to federal court. 98 The agents
had pleaded that they were charged with committing a homicide
while discharging their federal duties as Prohibition officers. After
attempting unsuccessfully to arrest some men for possession of an
illegal still, the officers had said, they discovered a wounded man
lying near the still and took him for medical treatment to a nearby
town, where he was pronounced dead. 99 Chief Justice Taft, in his
opinion for the Court, rejected the removal petitions on the ground
that the averments contained in them were "not sufficiently informing and specific to make a case for removal."' 1 The averments
were insufficient, the Court said, because they only asserted that
the acts of alleged misconduct had occurred "at a time when [the
federal officers] were engaged in performing their official duties"
and did not "negative the possibility that they were doing other acts
than official acts at the time."'' 1
The pleadings of United States Attorney Kolibash were no more
"informing and specific" than those of the Prohibition officers in
Soper (No. 1). Kolibash's pleadings were analogous to those in Soper
(No. 1) in that they contained an assertion that the alleged misconduct occurred while the federal officer was performing official
duties, a brief denial of wrongdoing, and no statement that explains
the causal connection between what was done under federal authority and the state proceeding. In addition, Kolibash's factual assertions, like those in Soper (No. 1), fail to exclude the possibility
98. 270 U.S. at 34-35.

99. Id. at 22-24.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 35. In elaborating further upon the deficiencies of the pleadings, the Court said:
It is true that, in their narration of the facts, their nearness to the place of Wenger's killing
and their effort to arrest the persons about to engage in alleged distilling are circumstances
possibly suggesting the reason and occasion for the criminal charge and the prosecution
against them. But they should do more than this in order to satisfy the statute. In order

to justify so exceptional a procedure, the person seeking the benefit of it should be candid,
specific and positive in explaining his relation to the transaction growing out of which he

has been indicted, and in showing that his relation to it was confined to his acts as an
officer.
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that the state proceeding was based on conduct not justified by his
federal duties. Thus, absent persuasive reasons to treat disciplinary
proceedings differently from criminal prosecutions as far as the statutory pleading requirements for federal-officer removal are concerned, the Fourth Circuit should have held in Kolibash that Soper
(No. 1) was controlling precedent, that Kolibash's pleadings, like
those in Soper (No. 1), did not aver a federal defense, and that the
district court was correct to remand the disciplinary proceeding to
the state system because it was removed improvidently and without
jurisdiction.
Rather than require Kolibash to plead with a high degree of
specificity, in accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Kolibash court applied a different and incompatible pleading rule, one that would sustain the most general and conclusory
pleadings. It appears, in other words, that the Fourth Circuit labored
under the impression that in removal cases involving federal officers,
"a broad statement in the [removal] petition" to the effect that "all
acts done by them were done under color of their federal office"
is. sufficient to satisfy the statute. 10 2 But as we have seen, "[tihis
''
...is not true under . . . § 1442. 103
The court of appeals argued that Kolibash is distinguishable from
Mesa, but its arguments are unpersuasive. One of the court's grounds
for distinction is that Mesa involved a criminal prosecution and Kolibash a "quasi-civil proceeding."' °4 If the court were able to show
that the disciplinary proceeding removed in Kolibash did in fact
resemble a civil action more closely than a criminal prosecution, it
would be at least arguable that the relatively strict pleading requirements applied to criminal prosecutions in Mesa and Soper (No.
1) were inapplicable in Kolibash, and that the applicable pleading
requirements were the more liberal ones that the Supreme Court
applied to a civil action in Willingham v. Morgan.0 5
The Willingham petitioners, the warden and chief medical officer
of a federal penitentiary, sought to remove to federal court a state
102.
103.
104.
105.

Michigan v. Banning, 88 F. Supp. 449, 450 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
Id.
872 F.2d at 576.
395 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1969).
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tort action brought against them by a prisoner in the institution at
which they were employed. 106 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, said:
In a civil suit of this nature, we think it was sufficient for petitioners to have
shown that their relationship to respondent derived solely from their official du[O]nce petitioners had shown that their only contact with respondent
ties ....
occurred inside the penitentiary, while they were performing their duties, we believe that they had demonstrated the required "causal connection." The connection consists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that petitioners were on
duty, at their place of federal employment, at all the relevant times."01

But the Court added in dictum: "Were this a criminal case, a more
detailed showing might be necessary because of the more compelling
state interest in conducting criminal trials in the state courts."'' 0
Thus, if the disciplinary proceeding in Kolibash were more analogous
to a civil action than to a criminal prosecution, and if the holding
in Willingham were therefore applicable to Kolibash, the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that Kolibash's pleadings were sufficient to warrant removal would be more plausible. This is true since Kolibash
did plead that the alleged misconduct took place while he was performing his federal duties at his place of federal employment.
The argument that the Kolibash disciplinary proceeding should
be classified as civil and that Kolibash is hence controlled by Willingham cannot withstand scrutiny, however. In the first place, disciplinary proceedings, which the Fourth Circuit labels "quasi-civil,"
can impose punitive sanctions and for that reason can also be, and
have been, described as "quasi-criminal."' 9
Second, because of the "compelling state interest" in having cases
involving charges of professional misconduct adjudicated by the statebar ethics committee and the state supreme court, 10 the Kolibash
disciplinary proceeding, which implicates highly important state interests, more closely resembles a criminal prosecution than a civil

106.
107.
108.
v. Soper
109.
110.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 409 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 409 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932); Maryland
(No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926)).
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
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action. It is therefore the dictum and not the holding in Willingham
that applies to Kolibash.
Third, the explanation of Willingham that the Supreme Court
provided in Mesa made clear that Kolibash must be classified with
Mesa and Soper (No. 1) and not with Willingham:
In Willingham we adverted to the causal connection test of Soper (No. 1),
not as a substitute for the averment of an official immunity defense, but as a

means of delimiting the pleading requirements for establishing a colorable defense
of that nature .... [W]e decline to divorce the federal official immunity defense
from the pleadings required to allege it and transform those pleading requirements

into an independent basis for jurisdiction."

Thus, contrary to what the Fourth Circuit appears to suppose in
Kolibash, a federal officer claiming immunity must do more than
plead facts showing that the alleged misconduct occurred while he
or she was performing federal duties in order to satisfy the removal
statute. The officer must first aver a "colorable" federal defense
of official immunity. If he or she can aver such a defense, then the
more liberal pleading requirements of Willingham apply. If, on the
other hand, the officer "ha[s] not and could not present an official
immunity defense," that is, if such a defense is not colorable, "the
liberal pleadings sufficient to allege an official immunity defense...
in Willingham are inapplicable." '" 2
Because federal-officer immunity is a valid defense in many state
tort actions, the United States Supreme Court concluded in both
Willingham and Mesa that such a defense was colorable in Willingham, and that the prison officials in the case therefore needed
only to satisfy the more liberal pleading requirements. But because
federal officials are never immune to state criminal prosecutions
brought against them for acts not authorized by federal law, the
Mesa court concluded that the mail-truck drivers in that case did
not and could not aver a colorable immunity defense and therefore
could not take advantage of the liberal pleading requirements of
Willingham."3
I11. 109 S.Ct. at 966-67 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 967 (citation omitted).
113. Id.
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Kolibash is clearly analogous to the removal cases involving criminal prosecutions, like Mesa and Soper (No. 1), and disanalogous
to the cases involving civil actions, like Willingham. The reason is
that the defense of official immunity is no more available to a prosecutor facing a disciplinary proceeding than it is to a11 mail-truck
4
driver facing criminal prosecution for a traffic offense.
C. The "Under Color of Office" Requirement and the
Averment of a FederalDefense: The Unavailability of an
Immunity Defense
Leaving aside the question of the sufficiency of the actual pleadings, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Kolibash is undermined by its
failure to perceive that it is difficult, if not impossible, even to
imagine how a United States Attorney could, in theory, avail himself
or herself of a colorable federal defense of official immunity to a
state-bar disciplinary proceeding. Conceivably, a federal attorney
might attempt to base such a defense upon In re Neagle, 15 in which
the United States Supreme Court decided that "if [a federal officer]
is held in the state court to answer for an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States,

...

and if in doing

that act he did no more than what was necessary and proper for
him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of the State
16
of California."'
An example of a case in which a claim of In re Neagle immunity
was colorable is City of Norfolk v. McFarland,1 7 which involved
a federal investigator who received a speeding citation while hurrying
to stage a raid on an illegal distillery. The district court held that
the prosecution brought against the investigator was removable because he was acting under color of office when stopped by the police
officer.' But it is difficult. to see how the claim that "the acts
complained of were justified by [his] duties under federal law"" 9
114. See infra notes 115-42 and accompanying text.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

135 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
143 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Va. 1956).
Id. at 590.
California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
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could be colorable if made by a federal prosecutor facing ethics
charges. It is virtually inconceivable that a prosecutor's federal duties
could ever require him or her to violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The United States Attorney who sought to claim In re Neagle
immunity to a state-bar disciplinary proceeding would almost inevitably find himself or herself in the same position as the federal
narcotics agent in Morgan v. California,120 whose claim of immunity
to state charges of driving under the influence of alcohol was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ground
that he had "not demonstrated how it would be necessary and proper
for him to drive while under the influence in order to carry out his
federal duty of meeting with an informant. 1'2 It is certain, in any
event, that there exists in fact no federal law that requires a federal
prosecutor to supervise subordinates in a manner prohibited by the
state bar's code of professional ethics.
A United States Attorney might also attempt, in a disciplinary
proceeding, to base a defense on the immunity of federal and state
prosecutors to civil liability for damages for common-law or constitutional torts committed while acting within the scope of their
prosecutorial duties. 22 As the Supreme Court has said, prosecutorial
immunity to tort damages is grounded in a concern that "harassment
by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would
shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by the public trust."' Citing Supreme Court cases
that recognize the immunity of prosecutors and other government
officials to "state and federal damages actions," the Fourth Circuit
concluded in Kolibash that "[p]olicies supporting the doctrine of
official immunity are plainly implicated here" because "state professional disciplinary proceedings could be used to interfere with the
duties of federal officials."124
120. 743 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 733.
122. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976); Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), mem. aff'g 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926).
123. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423.
124. 872 F.2d at 574-75.
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The United States Supreme Court made it clear in Mesa v. Cal-

ifornia,125 however, that a prosecutorial-immunity defense, if asserted by a United States Attorney facing state ethics charges, would
not be colorable. This is the clear implication of what the Court
says about whether the postal employees in Mesa could aver a federal
defense of immunity: "Mesa and Ebrahim ... could not present

an official immunity defense to the state criminal prosecutions
brought against them. This Court has never suggested that the policy

considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental

officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law.''126

The reasoning expressed here by the Supreme Court is just as applicable to the facts of Kolibash as it is to those of Mesa. Just as

the Supreme Court has never suggested that those officials who enjoy civil liability are "beyond the reach of the criminal law," it has
also never suggested that such officials, if they are lawyers, are be-

yond the reach of disciplinary proceedings. On the contrary, the
Court has stated on several occasions, both explicitly and implicitly,
that prosecutors, although immune to civil liability, remain at the
same time amenable to state-bar disciplinary proceedings.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that prosecutors are not immune to disciplinary proceedings 2 7 in Imbler v. Pachtman,'128 which

125. 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
126. Id. at 967 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976)).
127. The Court's prior decision in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959) (plurality opinion),
makes the same point by implication:
We are told that we should forbear from sanctioning any such rule of absolute privilege
lest it open the door to wholesale oppression and abuses on the part of unscrupulous government officials.... [There are of course other sanctions than civil tort suits available
to deter the executive official who may be prone to exercise his functions in an unworthy
and irresponsible manner.
This passage echoes an earlier statement made by Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) ("There must indeed
be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another
matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from
their errors."), mem. cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
Both Barr and Gregoire have been interpreted as authority for the proposition that official
immunity to disciplinary proceedings does not exist. Sauber v. Gliedman, 283 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir.
1960) ("Although the official may be immune to civil tort liability, he may nevertheless be subject
to discipline and professional censure where warranted.") (citing Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. at 576;
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 906 (1961).
128. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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is cited in Kolibash for the policy concerns that underlie the common-law civil immunity of prosecutors. 129 In Imbler the petitioner
brought a civil-rights action against a state prosecutor under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for loss of liberty allegedly caused
by unlawful prosecution. 3 0 The Supreme Court held, in an opinion
by Justice Powell, that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983."''
One reason the Supreme Court gave for its holding was that
"the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983
does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish
that which occurs.' ' 3 2 For one thing, the Court said, prosecutors
remain subject to criminal liability for their "willful acts."' 33 "Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose
acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability
to professionaldiscipline by an association of his peers. ''34 The only
"association" of a lawyer's peers that can subject him or her to
discipline is obviously the state bar association. Although it is obiter
dictum, the quoted statement shows unequivocally that the Supreme
Court is no more willing to countenance prosecutorial immunity to
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the state bar than it is to accept
official immunity to criminal liability in cases like Mesa.
The Court's view is that if prosecutors are to be immune to civil
liability, they must remain subject to both state-bar disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution so that the public will have some
means of deterring and preventing prosecutorial misconduct. As the
Court said in a later case, "[t]he organized bar's development and
enforcement of professional standards for prosecutors also lessen

129. 872 F.2d at 574.
130. 424 U.S. at 415-16.
131. Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 428-29.
133. Id. at 429 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In the footnote the Court cites, inter alia, the
MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSrBiLrrY EC 7-13 (1980), which enumerates some of the ethical
responsibilities of the prosecutor.
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the danger that absolute immunity will become a shield for pros-

ecutorial misconduct.

"135

The Imbler Court's use of the word moreover when referring to

the prosecutor's "amenability to professional discipline" implies that
it regards disciplinary proceedings as an even more valuable weapon
than criminal prosecution in the fight against prosecutorial abuse

of power. Because the respondent in Imbler was a state prosecutor,
it might be thought that the Court's dictum refers only to state
prosecutors. The general language of the opinion ("prosecutors";

"a prosecutor") and its reasoning are, however, equally applicable

1 6
to United States Attorneys. Moreover, in United States v. Hasting, 1

decided seven years after Imbler, the Supreme Court stated explicitly
that the United States District Courts might respond to cases of
misconduct on the part of United States Attorneys by ordering them

to show cause why they should not be disciplined. 137 In addition,
other courts have consistently said that government attorneys, both

federal 38 and state, 139 are not immune to state-bar disciplinary pro135. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1986).
136. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
137. Id. at 506 n.5.
138. E.g., United States v. Helmandollar, 852 F.2d 498, 502 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (United States
Attorney is subject to "discipline by the legal profession" for prosecutorial misconduct) (dictum);
United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1987) (if United States Attorney "has violated
ethical or legal canons ... the proper remedy is a disciplinary action against him") (dictum), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1986) (federal
attorney who defends government is entitled to absolute civil immunity, but "an alternative remedy
for abuse exists in the availability of professional disciplinary proceedings") (dictum); United States
v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 1984) (United States Attorney who violates rules of professional
conduct is "subject ... to disciplinary sanctions") (dictum); Ramos Colon v. United States Attorney,
576 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1978) (in case of misconduct by United States Attorney, district court has
discretion to decide whether to "reporto the misconduct to the appropriate professional association")
(dictum); Sauber v. Gliedman, 283 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1960) (Special Assistant to U.S. Attorney
General acting as federal prosecutor "may be immune to civil tort liability" but "may nevertheless
be subject to discipline and professional censure where warranted") (dictum), cert. denied, 366 U.S.906
(1961); United States v. Kelly, 543 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (D. Mass. 1982) (matter of United States
Attorney's alleged misconduct "referred to the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers to assess the
need for disciplinary proceedings"), supplemented, 550 F. Supp. 901 (D. Mass. 1982); Lusk v. Hanrahan, 244 F. Supp. 539, 540 (E.D. IIl. 1965) (United States Attorney, although immune to civil
liability, remains subject to disciplinary proceedings) (dictum). See also In re Sylvester, 41 F.2d 231,
236 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) ("the United States attorney and his aides are not privileged characters, but are
subject to precisely the same rules and penalties ... as other members of the bar of this court").
139. Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1989) (absolute immunity from suits for
damages does not insulate district attorney against "other types of sanctions," including "professional
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ceedings. In the earlier case of Minns v. Paul,140 a different three-

judge panel from the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the implications
of Imbler. Minns invoked the Supreme Court's observation in Imbler, that prosecutorial immunity to suits for damages under section
1983 "does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or
to punish that which occurs," 141 as one of the grounds for its holding
that the doctrine of absolute immunity covers court-appointed defense attorneys as well as prosecutors. But the Fourth Circuit's decision in Kolibash, by allowing the removal of the West Virginia
State Bar Association disciplinary proceeding to federal court, eliminates Kolibash's "amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers" and thus flies in the face of Imbler and
numerous other cases. If the court of appeals had followed the reasoning of Mesa and Imbler through to its logical conclusion, it would
have found in Kolibash that just as "Mesa and Ebrahim ... could
not present an official immunity defense to the state criminal prosecutions brought against them" 142 in California, so also Kolibash
could not aver an immunity defense to the state-bar disciplinary
proceeding brought against him in West Virginia. Such a finding

discipline") (dictum); Solles v. Israel, 868 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The State Bar Grievance
Committee found that the prosecutor's pre-trial conduct violated four disciplinary rules or canons of
ethics."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2457 (1989); Buffington v. Copeland, 687 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 n.12
(W.D. Tex. 1988) ("further disciplinary action against [District Attorney] Conaway is not foreclosed")
(dictum); Lundblade v. Doyle, 376 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D. Il1. 1974) (remedy for non-feasance by
state's attorney is "professional censure") (dictum); People v. Attorneys Respondent, 162 Colo. 174,
175-77, 427 P.2d 330, 330-31 (1967) (en banc) (per curiam) (district attorney's filing of criminal
complaint against debtor in order to assist private client in collecting debt warrants reprimand); In
re Nace, 490 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1985) (prosecutors are not immune to complaints to and discipline
by Board on Professional Responsibility) (dictum); Foster v. Pearcy, 270 Ind. 533, 537, 387 N.E.2d
446, 449 (1979) ("prosecutors are still subject to professional discipline if their actions stray beyond
the bounds of ethical conduct") (dictum), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 960 (1980); Chicopee Lions Club
v. District Attorney, 396 Mass. 244, 253, 485 N.E.2d 673, 678 (1985) (absolute immunity of district
attorney to civil liability does not render public powerless because "bar discipline proceedings are
available mechanisms which may serve to check an overzealous district attorney") (dictum); In re
Truder, 37 N.M. 69, 70-72, 17 P.2d 951, 951-52 (1932) (per curiam) (district attorney's filing of civil
suit against defendant whom he had previously prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter for same acts
held professional misconduct); State v. Cameron, 30 Wash. App. 229, 231, 633 P.2d 901, 903-04
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981) ("A completely unfounded information may subject the prosecutor to ...
disciplinary proceedings.")
140. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977).
141. Id. at 902.
142. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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would have precluded removal of the proceeding pursuant to section
1442.
D. The Absence of Other Federal Interests Sufficient to Support
Removal
The Fourth Circuit contended that even if Kolibash neither did
nor could aver a federal defense to the disciplinary proceeding
brought against him by the West Virginia State Bar, other federal
interests sufficient to support removal of the proceeding to federal
court were at stake. 14 The court makes four brief arguments in
support of this contention. All four arguments are fallacious.
The first argument runs as follows: "Kolibash's alleged misconduct ...

arose out of a federal grand jury drug investigation and

a subsequent criminal trial in federal district court. Significant federal interests are therefore involved regardless of whether Kolibash
has a federal defense to the state professional disciplinary proceeding."' 144 In this respect, the Fourth Circuit asserts, Kolibash is distinguishable from Mesa, which involved the prosecution of state
rather than federal crimes. 145 The first argument is without merit.
It is true that Kolibash's alleged misconduct took place during the
investigation and trial of federal crimes, and that there was a federal
interest in that investigation and trial. However, once the disciplinary
action had been commenced in the state system, and Kolibash had
petitioned for removal under section 1442, the issue in the case, as
in Mesa v. California, was whether any "significant federal interest
[would be] served by removal."' 46 The federal interest in the original
investigation and trial hardly implies, as the Fourth Circuit appears
to have assumed, a federal interest in removal of the disciplinary
proceeding to federal court.
Since the state disciplinary proceeding was distinct and separate
from the federal criminal prosecution in which the alleged misconduct occurred and, moreover, was not even commenced, as the Fourth
143. Kolibash, 872 F.2d at 571.

144. Id. at 575.
145. Id.
146. Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 970 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Circuit acknowledged, 147 until after that prosecution was completed,
removal of the proceeding could not possibly have enhanced the
ability of the United States Attorney's office to investigate or prosecute federal crimes as the Fourth Circuit implies. In addition, the
purpose of the disciplinary proceeding was the state purpose of determining whether Kolibash was fit to practice law in West Virginia
and not the federal purpose of determining whether a federal crime
had been committed. In this respect Kolibash is analogous to Mesa
and not distinguishable from it, as the court of appeals asserted. It
is thus difficult to see how the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the
federal interest in prosecuting federal crimes was served by removing
the disciplinary proceeding to the district court can be defended.
The court's second argument is that Kolibash also raised another
kind of federal question:
There is a world of difference between the duties of prosecutorial supervision
involved here [in Kolibash]and the circumstances of Mesa where the federal postal
employees seeking removal clearly "could not present an official immunity defense
to the state criminal prosecutions brought against them." Indeed, this case...

involves the extent of a United States Attorney's responsibility for the acts of his
subordinates .... 148

The court did not explain exactly what this "world of difference"
consisted of or why it was legally significant. However, the court
appears to imply that whereas the state criminal prosecutions brought
against the postal employees in Mesa could not possibly raise a federal question, the disciplinary proceeding brought against Kolibash
did raise such a question, namely, the extent of a United States
Attorney's "responsibility" for the acts of his subordinates.
This second argument fails because the court of appeals is wrong
to assume, as it evidently does, that the question of the scope of
a United States Attorney's responsibility for the acts of his or her
subordinates was a federal question. In fact, the question was not
one of federal law but one of professional ethics in the state of
West Virginia. More specifically, the issue was not whether, as a
matter of federal authority, United States Attorney Kolibash was
147. 872 F.2d at 572.
148. Id. at 575 (citations omitted) (quoting Mesa, 109 S. Ct. at 967).
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responsible for the acts of his subordinate, but rather, whether Kolibash did in fact violate his ethical responsibilities as a member of
the West Virginia bar.
The state bar association charged that by failing to prevent the
Assistant United States Attorney from participating in a federal investigation and prosecution of persons whom the attorney had previously represented, Kolibash violated DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall
not "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice,' 1 49 or violated DR 6-101(A)(3), which states that a lawyer
1 The resoshall not "[n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him."' 50
lution of that issue does not depend on federal law applicable only
to federal prosecutors but on the code of professional ethics applicable to West Virginia lawyers generally.
If the court's argument here is that Kolibash, unlike the postal
employees in Mesa, averred a colorable federal defense of official
immunity to the disciplinary proceeding because he claimed that federal law required or authorized him to supervise the Assistant United
States Attorney in the way that he did, the argument is unpersuasive.
As noted above,' 5 ' a defense consisting of nothing more than the
vague, unsubstantiated, and implausible implication that federal law
required or authorized violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility can hardly be described as colorable. Moreover, Kolibash failed to specify any such federal law in his pleadings or to
plead any other specific facts sufficient to support the conclusion
that he actually did aver a colorable defense of this kind.
The third argument the Kolibash court made to support its conclusion that there was a federal interest in removal is as follows:
Mesa involved a criminal prosecution. This case [Kolibash] involves a hybrid,
quasi-civil proceeding. Civil proceedings, of course, are not subject to the checks
which normally attend the criminal process and may be instituted at the behest
of a single individual. Although the State Bar is the formal party at interest, the
action here has its origin in a single complaint-that of [one individual]. That

149.

CODE OF PROFSIONAL REsPONSmiLrrY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1978).
150. Id. DR 6-101(A)(3).
151. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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complaint went to the heart of a critical federal function-a United States At52
torney's supervision of his own staff.

Once again, the court's argument is invalid. In the first place, the
court's assertion that the disciplinary action brought against Kolibash was not a criminal but a "quasi-civil proceeding" flatly contradicts the Supreme Court's characterization of such proceedings.
In In re Ruffalo 53 the Supreme Court stated that, at least for dueprocess purposes, disbarment proceedings similar to those involved
in Kolibash are "proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature," 15 4 and a
number of other courts have expressed the same view. 155
The reason given by the Fourth Circuit for categorizing statebar disciplinary proceedings as "quasi-civil" is that they "are not
subject to the checks which normally attend the criminal process
and may be instituted at the behest of a single individual."' 56 This
assertion is demonstrably false. It is true that disciplinary proceedings may be initiated, as in Kolibash, in response to the complaint
of a single individual, but this does not by itself establish that such
proceedings are not subject to the checks that normally attend the
criminal process. Criminal prosecutions may also result from an individual's complaint. The important consideration is whether the
decision to commence the action lies entirely within the discretion
of a private individual. In this respect disciplinary proceedings resemble criminal prosecutions far more closely than they do civil
actions. The reason is that "the law does not authorize an individual
to institute and maintain a formal action against a lawyer for dis-

152. 872 F.2d at 576.
153. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
154. Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
155. E.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to "quasi-criminal nature of bar disciplinary proceedings"); In
re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Attorney disbarment and suspension cases are quasicriminal in character."); Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984)
(attorney disciplinary proceedings are 'quasi-criminal' in nature"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985);
Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("disciplinary proceedings 'are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature'); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209 (2d Cir. 1972) ("a
court's disciplinary proceeding against a member of its bar is comparable to a criminal rather than
to a civil proceeding" because such a proceeding may result in serious punishment, including loss of
livelihood and reputation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
156. Kolibash, 872 F.2d at 576.
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barment. ' ' 5 7 The power to bring a disciplinary proceeding resides

exclusively in the courts and in the bar committees they have authorized to supervise attorney conduct. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained the role of the individual complainant: "An individual may, acting as an informer,
make available to the... court pertinent information bearing upon
the qualifications or professional conduct of a member of the ...
bar. Beyond that point the individual may not exercise control over
the proceedings. Further action, if any, becomes the responsibility
of the court."' 58 Thus, a disciplinary proceeding, like a criminal
prosecution and unlike a civil action, cannot be initiated unless the
complainant can persuade a number of impartial officials that his
or her complaint has merit.
In West Virginia the state bar association's Committee on Legal
Ethics, which is "the instrumentality of the supreme court of appeals," 15 9 investigates and screens complaints. The committee thus
operates as a check on the unbridled power of the private complainant in cases of alleged attorney misconduct,'16 just as the prosecutors and the grand jury do in cases involving allegations of

157. Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 939 (1966);
accord Ramos Colon v. United States Attorney, 576 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Phillips, 510
F.2d 126, 126 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Ginsburg v. Stem, 125 F. Supp. 596, 603 (W.D. Pa. 1954),
aff'd, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc).
158. Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d at 319.
WEST Vmomiu STATE BAR art. VI, § 4 (1988).
159. BY-LAws oF T
160. Id.
There shall be a committee known as "the committee on legal ethics of The West
Virginia State Bar," which shall have jurisdiction to make investigations ... of every complaint, request and information respecting legal ethics, unprofessional conduct, [or] malpractice... which may come before it, and to hold hearings thereon and make such findings
and recommendations and take such other action as is authorized by this article.
The Investigative Panel of the Committee on Legal Ethics shall be responsible for
conducting investigations on behalf of the committee. Bar counsel and committee counsel
shall have authority ... to collect evidence and information for the Investigative Panel
concerning any complaint ....
Bar counsel and committee counsel are ... authorized ... to recommend ... the
dismissal of complaints which counsel deems to be unjustified ....
... When the investigation is completed the [Investigative Panel] shall either (1) direct
closing of the file ... ; or (2) upon a finding that probable cause exists to hold a hearing,
recommend to the Hearing Panel that a formal hearing be held ....
Id. at §§ 4, 12.
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criminal activity. Therefore, in Kolibash, the Fourth Circuit's argument rests upon a false premise, insofar as it argues that there
is a federal interest in the removal of a disciplinary proceeding

brought against a United States Attorney because private individuals
have unlimited power to disrupt the work of federal prosecutors by

instituting such proceedings.
The fourth argument the court of appeals made in Kolibash is
that although "[riegulation of the legal profession ... implicates
significant state interests, . . the federal interest in protecting fed-

eral officials in the performance of their federal duties is paramount.' 161 Such protection is necessary, the court believes, because
"federal officials may be subject to potentially abusive state proc2
ess" ':16
Although we intimate no view as to the underlying merits of the present action,
state professional disciplinary proceedings could be used to interfere with the
duties of federal officials, including the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the United States, all of whom may
be lawyers. Federal prosecutors too may be targets of retaliatory state proceedings
163

This argument might be thought to establish a reasonable basis
for the decision in Kolibash, if not for the fact that in Mesa the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected a similar argument as insufficient
to establish a predicate for federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a):
In these prosecutions, no state court hostility or interference has even been alleged
by petitioners ....
... We are simply unwilling to credit the Government's ominous intimations of
hostile state prosecutors and collaborationist state courts interfering with federal
officers by charging them with traffic violations and other crimes for which they
would have no federal defense in immunity or otherwise. That is certainly not
the case in the prosecutions of Mesa and Ebrahim .... 164

Thus, according to the United States Supreme Court, the abstract
possibility of state hostility to a federal officer or to the enforcement
161.
162.
163.
164.

872 F.2d at 575.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
109 S. Ct. at 969.
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of federal law is not enough to meet the statutory requirements for
removal. Unless the federal officer seeking removal shows or at least
alleges that such hostility actually exists, his or her petition for removal must be denied.
United States Attorney Kolibash made no such showing or allegation. The Fourth Circuit's opinion contains "ominous intimations" of state-bar ethics proceedings brought for reasons of state
hostility to a federal prosecutor. But there is no more reason to
credit such intimations in Kolibash than there was in Mesa. The
decision of the court of appeals in Kolibash that the mere possibility
of state harassment satisfies section 1442 thus plainly contravenes
the Supreme Court's holding in Mesa.
E. The Inconsistency of Kolibash with Supreme Court Precedent
Recognizing the Important State Interest in Regulating Attorney
Misconduct
One of the policy considerations that supports the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Mesa, that criminal prosecutions brought
against mail-truck drivers for manslaughter and traffic violations
cannot be removed to federal court, is the importance of the state's
interest in the regulation of crime. In Mesa the Court said:
[U]nder our federal system, it goes without saying that preventing and dealing
with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal
Government. Because the regulation of crime is pre-eminently a matter for the
States, we have identified a strong judicial policy against federal interference with
state criminal proceedings.165

The Court concluded by saying: "It is hardly consistent with this
'strong judicial policy' to permit removal of state criminal prosecutions of federal officers and thereby impose potentially extraordinary burdens on the States when absolutely no federal question
' 166
is at issue in such prosecutions.
The above reasoning of the Mesa Court is equally applicable to
Kolibash. For the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the reg-

165. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 243 (1981)).
166. Id. at 969.
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ulation of the licensing and professional conduct of attorneys is,
like the regulation of crime, a matter for the states. Thus, in an
early case presenting a challenge to the refusal of the Supreme Court
of Virginia to admit a woman to its bar, the Supreme Court said
that the highest court of the state had the sole power to determine
whether women should be admitted to practice in Virginia. 6 7 More
recently, in reviewing the refusal of the Supreme Court of Illinois
to admit an applicant to the state bar, the Court stated that "[t]he
responsibility for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests with
8
Illinois."1 6
In Leis v. Flynt,169 which involved a constitutional challenge to
an Ohio trial court's refusal to allow two out-of-state attorneys to
represent defendants in a pending state criminal case, the Court
stated:
Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has
been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their re-

spective jurisdictions. The States prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of professional conduct. They are also responsible for the

discipline of lawyers.170

The Court expressed the same view in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association, 7' which presented a first-amendment challenge to disciplinary proceedings brought against an Ohio attorney by the state
bar association because of his personal solicitation of accident victims as clients:
The state interests implicated in this case are particularly strong.... [Tihe

State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of
the licensed professions. "The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.'1'72

167. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 118 (1894).
168. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570-71 (1945).
169. 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam).
170. Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
171. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
172. Id. at 460 (citations omitted) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975)). The Court adds in a footnote:
The organized bars, operating under codes approved by the highest state courts pursuant
to statutory authority, have the primary responsibility for assuring compliance with pro-
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These foregoing statements concerning the strength of the state
interest in regulating the legal profession are obviously very similar
to the one made in Mesa concerning the importance of the state
interest in regulating crime, cited by the Court as one of the grounds
of its decision in that case. It follows, as Judge Lumbard of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said, that
"when state courts ... initiate an inquiry into an attorney's conduct, they deal with a matter of such great importance to the state
and its citizens that federal courts should be as slow to intervene
in those proceedings as in state criminal proceedings. ' 17 In Koli-

bash, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit failed altogether
to take the Supreme Court's "strong policy" against federal interference with state-bar disciplinary proceedings into account. On the

basis of that policy and the absence of any federal defense or other
federal question from the disciplinary proceeding at issue in the case,
the Fourth Circuit should have rejected the removal petition of United

States Attorney Kolibash.
The federal courts of appeals have also generally recognized that
the regulation of attorney conduct is a matter for the states. 174 The

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has itself acknowledged
that "[e]nforcement of ethical standards is the primary concern of

the state courts and of state associations of lawyers and judges. "175
The decision in Kolibash is thus in conflict with other cases decided
by the Fourth Circuit, other courts of appeals, and the United States

Supreme Court.
fessional ethics and standards by the more than 400,000 lawyers licensed by the States. The
means employed usually are disciplinary proceedings initially conducted by voluntary bar
committees, subject to judicial review.
Id. at 466 n.28.
173. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
174. E.g., Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility, 717 F.2d 1424, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("State courts ... possess exclusive authority to regulate admission to their respective state bars and
bear responsibility for disciplining errant bar members."); In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d
Cir.) (Rosenn, J., concurring) ("admission to the bar and discipline of attorneys is peculiarly within
the province of the states"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975); Saier v. State Bar, 293 F.2d 756,
759 (6th Cir. 1961) ("License to practice law, the continuation of such license, regulation of the
practice and the procedure for disbarment and discipline are all matters that are within the province
of an individual state."), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 947 (1961).
175. Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1965).
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The United States Supreme Court's "strong policy" against federal-court interference with state-bar disciplinary proceedings also
manifests itself in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden
State Bar Association.176 In that case the Court was called upon to
decide whether principles of comity and federalism require a federal
court to abstain from considering a challenge to the constitutionality
of state-bar disciplinary rules that are the subject of pending disciplinary proceedings. The New Jersey state-bar proceedings at issue
were similar to those involved in Kolibash in that they arose out of
professional-misconduct charges brought against an attorney by a
state-bar ethics committee acting as the administrative arm of the
state supreme court.
In the leading abstention case, Younger v. Harris,7 7 the Court
noted that "[s]ince the beginning of this country's history Congress
has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state
courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts.' ' 7 8
One of the main reasons for this policy, the Court said, is
the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
79
functions in their separate ways.'

Applying these principles to the issue of state-bar disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court stated in Middlesex County Ethics
Committee that the policies that justify federal-court abstention "are
fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important
state interests are involved." 180 Once again the Court characterized
the state interest in regulating the professional conduct of attorneys
as a highly important one:
The State of New Jersey, in common with most States, recognizes the important state obligation to regulate persons who are authorized to practice law....

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

457 U.S. 423 (1982).
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Id.at 43.
Id. at 44.
457 U.S. at 432 (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975)).
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The State of New Jersey has an extremely important interest in maintaining
and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses. States traditionally have exercised extensive control over the professional conduct of attorneys. The ultimate objective of such control is "the protection of the public, the
purification of the bar and the prevention of a reoccurrence."' 8

Significantly, the Court added that "[t]he State's interest in the professional conduct of attorneys involved in the administration of
1 82
criminal justice is of special importance.'
Because of "[t]he importance of the state interest in the pending
state judicial proceedings," and also because "the constitutional
claims of respondents can be determined in the state proceedings,"
and "there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other
extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate," the Court held that the federal courts should abstain from
intervening. 183 Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, summarized succinctly the reasoning that supports the holding:
[Flederal courts should show particular restraint before intruding into an ongoing
disciplinary proceeding by a state court against a member of the State's bar, where
there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal issues in that proceeding. The
traditional and primary responsibility of state courts for establishing and enforcing
standards for members of their bars and the quasi-criminal nature of bar dis-

ciplinary proceedings call for exceptional deference by the federal courts."

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Middlesex County Ethics
Committee, several of the United States Courts of Appeals handed
down similar decisions, which recognized the importance of the state
interest in regulating attorney misconduct and held that principles
of comity require federal-court abstention from pending state-bar
disciplinary proceedings. 185 In one of those cases, Erdmann v. Stev-

181. 457 U.S. at 432-34 (footnote and citations omitted).
182. Id. at 434.
183. Id. at 435.
184. Id. at 438 (concurring opinion) (citations omitted).
185. Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 558 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1977). The court stated:
[Tihe field of state attorney discipline is one that is particularly well suited to the principle
of federal court non-interference. The traditional power of the state courts to establish
standards for members of their bars and to discipline them ... suggests that incursions
by federal courts into ongoing disciplinary proceedings would be peculiarly disruptive of

notions of comity.
Id. at 703-04 (footnotes omitted); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1975),
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ens, Judge Lumbard of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

explained with some specificity what is at stake for the states:
The state "has a legitimate interest in determining whether [an individual] has
the qualities of character and the professional competence requisite to the practice
of law." Indeed the state's responsibility in these matters is primary. A lawyer
to practice anywhere in the United States must first be admitted to the bar of
one of the states. In New York, as in all of the states, the proper functioning
of the judicial system depends upon the competence and integrity of the members
of the bar and their compliance with appropriate standards of professional responsibility.11

The Supreme Court's policy of refusing to allow the federal courts
to intervene in state disciplinary proceedings is also evident in those
cases in which the Court has considered disbarment decisions handed
down by state supreme courts. Thus, in a landmark case involving
an attorney disbarred by the Supreme Court of Michigan, Selling
v. Radford,187 the Court said: "[W]e have no authority to re-examine
or reverse as a reviewing court the action of the Supreme Court of
Michigan in disbarring a member of the Bar of the courts of that
state for personal and professional misconduct ..

Likewise,

".."188

in a case involving an attorney disbarred in Louisiana, Theard v.
United States,18 9 the Court said that, except for its power to review
their constitutionality, "[i]t is not for this Court ... to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments." 1 90 The foregoing two cases have
been understood to stand for the proposition that the federal courts

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
The interest of the state court in adjudicating the continuing professional fitness and character of its own officers is . . . great . . . . [T]he state which licenses those who practice
in its courts, and which is the only body that can impose sanctions upon [them], should
not be deterred or diverted from the venture by the interloping of a federal court.
Id. at 432; Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
mhe effective functioning of any court depends upon its ability to command respect ....
[I]f a state court were subject to the supervisory intervention of a federal overseer at the
threshold of the court's initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against its own officer, the
state judiciary might suffer an unfair and unnecessary blow to its integrity and effectiveness.
Id. at 1210.
186. 458 F.2d at 1213 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Baird v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 1, 7 (1971)).
187. 243 U.S. 46 (1917).
188. Id. at 50.
189. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
190. Id. at 281.
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in general have no jurisdiction to review an order of a state court
disbarring an attorney. 191 If a decision in a disciplinary proceeding
is not reviewable by the Supreme Court or any other federal court
after it has been made by a state supreme court, then surely such
a decision should not be made in the first instance by a federal
district court.
As the numerous cases in which the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals have recognized the importance of the state interest
in regulating attorney misconduct clearly show, Kolibash is entirely
inconsistent with a large and diverse body of prior law and the
policies and reasoning that underlie and justify it. Kolibash is at
odds with many decisions on federalism, comity, federal-court abstention, and the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In the absence of clear and unmistakable congressional authorization
or other compelling justification, neither of which was present in
Kolibash, the Fourth Circuit should not have rendered a decision
that is impossible to reconcile with established doctrine.
F. The "'Civil Action or Criminal Prosecution" Requirement:
The Special Status of Disciplinary Proceedings
With regard to the third issue of statutory construction decided
in Kolibash, the West Virginia State Bar Association argued that
regardless of whether the "under color of office" test was met, the
disciplinary proceeding brought against Kolibash was not a "civil
action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court"' 192 and
was therefore not removable under section 1442.191 The Fourth Cir' 94
cuit rejected "such a narrow reading of the removal provision' 1
and explained its reasoning as follows:
The central concern of the removal statute is that a federal officer or agent
shall not be forced to answer for acts performed under color of his office in

191. E.g., Ginger v. Circuit Court, 372 F.2d 621, 625 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935
(1967); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1966); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107,
108 (10th Cir. 1962).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1982).
193. 872 F.2d at 576.
194. Id.
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anything but a federal forum. Regardless of what label is attached to the proceeding, § 1442(a)(1) should be construed in light of this purpose. The form that
the state action takes is therefore not controlling; "it is the state's power to subject
federal officers to the state's process that § 1442(a)(1) curbs."
The Committee on Legal Ethics is defined as an instrumentality of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and its procedures are adjudicatory in nature.
The Committee is authorized to hold evidentiary hearings, subpoena witnesses,
take testimony under oath in an adversary proceeding, and otherwise conduct
itself as a court. It also makes factual findings and recommends attorney sanctions
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. A Committee investigation can
result in public reprimands, suspensions, or disbarment of lawyers who practice
in West Virginia. To hold this proceeding outside the operation of the removal
statute would be to elevate form over substance. If a state investigative body
operates in an adjudicatory manner, and if a federal officer or his agent is subject
to its process, the statutory requirements of § 1442(a)(1) are satisfied. 19'

The above reasoning is fatally flawed because its central premise-

namely, the assumption that a disciplinary proceeding can force a
federal prosecutor "to answer" in a state forum "for acts performed
under color of his office"-is false. In addition, the court's conclusion, that a disciplinary proceeding is a "civil action or criminal
prosecution commenced in a State court," is in conflict with wellsettled legal doctrine in the state of West Virginia and throughout

the nation.
The Fourth Circuit is obviously correct in saying that statebar disciplinary proceedings can result in the punishment of attorneys. That fact has led the Supreme Court to describe such
proceedings as "quasi-criminal" and to hold that attorneys against
whom they are brought are entitled to procedural due process. 196

But the issue under section 1442 is not whether a disciplinary
proceeding is quasi-criminal but whether it is a "civil action or
criminal prosecution." It does not follow from the fact that such
a proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature that it is a criminal prosecution. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

97

and

195. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Nationwide Investors v. Miller, 793 F.2d 1044, 1047).
196. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968). See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
197. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Graziani, 157 W. Va. 167, 171-72, 200 S.E.2d 353, 355
(1973) (per curiam) ("It is true that one case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
In re Ruffalo .... indicated that disbarment proceedings were quasi-criminal .... However, a quasicriminal proceeding does not mean it is a criminal proceeding.
), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974).
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other courts 198 have recognized, quasi-criminal proceedings and
criminal prosecutions are distinct and should not be confused.
The gist of the Fourth Circuit's argument is that a disciplinary
proceeding falls within the statutory category because such a proceeding can subject a federal officer to state process, adjudication,
and punishment for acts performed "under color of office," which
is precisely what the removal statute is intended to prevent. Once
again, however, the court did not explain its reasoning adequately.
In particular, it did not explain why it assumed, as if it were selfevidently true, that a disciplinary proceeding, like an ordinary civil
action or criminal prosecution, can force a federal officer to answer
in a state forum for acts performed "under color of office." A
disciplinary proceeding would certainly have that capability if "acts
performed under color of ...

office" were synonymous with "acts

performed in the course of federal employment," that is, if the
purpose of the removal statute were to ensure that federal officers
never have to answer in a state forum for anything they have done
while performing their federal duties. But as we have seen, that is
not its purpose; its purpose, rather, is to guarantee to federal officers
a federal forum only in cases where the officers can aver and have
averred a federal defense (or can raise and have raised some other
federal question). 199
The Fourth Circuit's argument must be, therefore, that the disciplinary proceeding brought against Kolibash should be counted as
a "civil action or criminal prosecution" because the proceeding could
subject him to state process, adjudication, and punishment in a state
forum, despite his having averred a federal defense to the charges
of professional misconduct (or having raised some other federal
question). The court's argument is unpersuasive because, as we have
seen, the court failed to demonstrate that Kolibash did in fact aver
a federal defense, or that he did in fact raise some other federal
question, or even that it was possible for a federal prosecutor to

198. See, e.g., In re McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 180, 191 So. 2d 1, 7 (1966) (per curiam) ("Disbarment
proceedings are neither civil nor criminal, but are sui generis. In their criminal aspect they are at
most quasi criminal.").
199. See supra notes 9-41 and accompanying text.
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aver a federal defense or raise a federal question in a disciplinary
proceeding.2°°
It has been argued here that a disciplinary proceeding brought
against a United States Attorney does not in fact permit the averment of the federal defense of official immunity or any other federal
defense.20' In addition, it has been argued that the issue presented
by such a proceeding-namely, whether the prosecutor's conduct
violated the ethical standards of the state bar-is not in fact a federal
question but a state question. 20 2 If these arguments are sound, they
demonstrate the falsity of the Fourth Circuit's assumption that a
disciplinary proceeding can force a United States Attorney to answer
in a state forum for acts performed under color of federal office
and the invalidity of its conclusion which rests on that assumption,
that a disciplinary proceeding is a "civil action or criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the removal statute.
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion on the "civil action or criminal
prosecution" issue also conflicts with the account of state-bar disciplinary proceedings given by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia. Although the issue of whether a disciplinary proceeding commenced by the bar association of a particular state on
behalf of the state supreme court is a civil action or criminal prosecution for the purposes of the removal statute is an issue of federal
law, it is clear that a federal court must base its resolution of the
issue on the way in which the supreme court of the state in question
has characterized such proceedings.
In Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State BarAssn, 103
one of the issues faced by the Supreme Court was whether "state
bar disciplinary hearings ... constitute an ongoing state judicial

proceeding" 204 within the meaning of the abstention doctrine of
Younger v. Harris.20 5 Although this was a question of federal law,

200. See supra notes 115-64 and accompanying text.

201. See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 165-91 and accompanying text.
203. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
204. Id. at 432.
205. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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the Court sought the answer in the law of New Jersey. After ex-

amining what the state supreme court had said about the nature of
disciplinary proceedings in a number of cases, the Court concluded:
"It is clear beyond doubt that the New Jersey Supreme Court con-

siders its bar disciplinary proceedings as 'judicial in nature.

'206

"As

such," the Court held, "the proceedings are of a character to war-

rant federal-court deference."0 7 In a similar case recently decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Wilkinson
208
relied upon state law in the same way.
In the analogous situation presented by Kolibash, the Fourth

Circuit should have based its determination of whether a disciplinary
proceeding is a civil action or criminal prosecution within the meaning of section 1442 on the West Virginia Supreme Court's characterization of such proceedings. In West Virginia" [i]t is well-settled
that disbarment proceedings ...

are neither civil actions nor crim-

inal prosecutions but are special proceedings peculiar in their nature. ' '209 Thus, if the court of appeals had relied upon West Virginia
law as it should have in Kolibash, it would have concluded that
removal of the disciplinary proceeding did not satisfy the "civil action or criminal prosecution" requirement of section 1442.

Most other jurisdictions are in agreement with West Virginia as
to the nature of state-bar disciplinary proceedings. A few courts have

206. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 433-34 (footnote omitted). In a footnote the
Court adds: "The New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that bar disciplinary proceedings are
neither criminal nor civil in nature, but rather are sui generis." Id. at 433 n.12 (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 434. See also Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984)
(federal court deciding whether takings authorized by state statute violate "public use" requirement
of fifth and fourteenth amendments is bound by determination of state legislature that enacted statute).
208. Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson,
J.) (for purposes of Younger abstention doctrine, administrative proceeding is not judicial in nature
"if state law expressly indicates that the proceeding is not a judicial proceeding").
209. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 161 W. Va. 240, 249, 240 S.E.2d 668, 673 (1977)
(per curiam) (citations omitted); accord Daily Gazette Co. v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 326 S.E.2d
705, 711 (W. Va. 1984); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Graziani, 157 W. Va. 167, 171-72, 200 S.E.2d
353, 355 (1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); In re Brown, 157 W. Va. 1, 7-8,
197 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (1973) (per curiam); see also In re Pauley, 314 S.E.2d 391, 399-400 (W. Va.
1983) (judicial disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal but have unique purpose of
maintaining proper administration of justice).
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described such proceedings as civil rather than criminal in nature ,210
most often in the context of determining what burden-of-proof standard applies. 211 But the overwhelming majority of courts, both
federal212 and state, 2 3 have stated that disciplinary proceedings are
neither civil actions nor criminal prosecutions but are sui generis.
Thus, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit says that
disbarment and suspension proceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature
but are special proceedings, sui generis, and result from the inherent power of
courts over their officers. Such proceedings are not lawsuits between parties litigant but rather are in the nature of an inquest or inquiry as to the conduct of
the respondent.

24

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit takes a similar view:

210. E.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Bromwell, 389 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 1986)
(for purposes of rules on admissibility of evidence, disciplinary proceedings are not criminal but special
civil proceedings); Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 438, 231 N.E.2d 718, 721, 285 N.Y.S.2d
1, 6 (1967) (for fifth-amendment purposes, disciplinary proceedings are not criminal but civil), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
211. E.g., In re Shannon, 274 Ark. 106, 621 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1981); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Wittmaack, 513 Pa. 609, 620-21, 522 A.2d 522, 527 (1987); State v. Wildermuth, 76 Wis.
2d 476, 481, 251 N.W.2d 779, 781 (1977) (per curiam).
212. Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1016 (1985); Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.), appeal
dismissed, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1081 (1984); In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970); Mattice
v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 939 (1966).
213. In re McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 180, 191 So. 2d 1, 7 (1966) (per curiam); In re Mackay, 416
P.2d 823, 838 (Alaska 1964), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966); Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d
436, 447, 521 P.2d 858, 865, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602, 609 (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974); State v.Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 452-53, 91 A. 274, 276 (1914); State ex rel. Florida Bar v.
Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427, 431 (Fla. 1959); In re Moore, 453 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ind. 1983) (per curiam);
In re Czachorski, 41 Ill. 2d 549, 554, 244 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1969); State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 566,
639 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1982) (per curiam); Anne Arundel County Bar Ass'n v. Collins, 272 Md. 578,
582-83, 325 A.2d 724, 727 (1974); Bar Ass'n v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 191-93, 97 N.E. 751, 753-54
(1912); In re Rerat, 232 Minn. 1, 4-5, 44 N.W.2d 273, 274-75 (1950); In re Prisock, 244 Miss. 427,
143 So. 2d 434, 436 (1962); In re Mills, 539 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State v. Merski,
121 N.H. 901, 909, 437 A.2d 710, 714-15 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); In
re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 227, 358 A.2d 787, 790 (1976) (per curiam); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Illman,
45 Ohio St. 2d 159, 161-62, 342 N.E.2d 688, 690 (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976);
In re Evinger, 604 P.2d 844, 845 (Okla. 1979); In re Holman, 297 Or. 36, 682 P.2d 243, 260 (1984)
(en bane) (per curiam); In re Kunkle, 88 S.D. 269, 280, 218 N.W.2d 521, 527, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1036 (1974); Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Vick, 40 Tenn. App. 206, 213-14, 290 S.W.2d
871, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 975 (1957); In re Sherman, 58 Wash. 2d 1,
8, 363 P.2d 390, 391 (1961) (en banc) (per curiam).
214. In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970).
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In a disbarment proceeding, the petition does not initiate an action, either civil
or criminal. Rather, "[s]uch a petition invokes the inherent power of the courts
to maintain the integrity of the bar and to see that courts and its members do
not fall into disrepute with the general public through unprofessional or fraudulent
21
conduct."'

Because an attorney is an officer of the court that admitted him or
her to the bar, "[tihe court, by reason of the necessary and inherent

power vested in it to control the conduct of its own affairs and to
maintain its own dignity, has a summary jurisdiction to deal with
'21 6
the alleged misconduct.
The proceeding that results from the exercise of that jurisdiction
is neither a civil action nor a criminal prosecution. A disciplinary
proceeding is not a civil action because
[a] civil action is one between parties. Here [in a disciplinary proceeding], an
attorney is called to answer to the court of his appointment for his conduct as
an officer of that court. The inquiry is directed solely to his continued fitness.
There is no plaintiff. The State is not a party .... There may be ... one who
has called the court's attention to alleged misconduct, but he is in no sense a
party, and has no interest in the outcome save as all good citizens or worthy
members of the bar may have. The complaint made, the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it
27
to require. 1

Nor is a disciplinary proceeding, albeit "quasi-criminal," a criminal
prosecution, since it is not commenced by the state. Moreover, as
the supreme court of West Virginia has said, its purpose "is not
punishment but rather the protection of the public and the reas-

surance of the public as to the reliability and integrity of attorneys. "218 "[A] clear distinction exists between proceedings whose
215. Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1965) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 939 (1966).
216. Bar Ass'n v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 192, 97 N.E. 751, 754 (1912); accord Exparte Bradley,
74 U,S. (7 Wall.) 364, 374 (1868) ("If guilty of ...any ... act of official or personal dishonesty
and oppression, [attorneys] become subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court."); Ex parte
Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1883) ("a court has power to exercise a summary jurisdiction over its
attorneys ... to punish them ...

for misconduct ...

and, in gross cases of misconduct, to strike

their names from the roll"); State ex rel. Sheiner v. Giblin, 73 So. 2d 851, 851-52 (Fla. 1954); In
re Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 582, 192 N.E. 65, 68 (1934).
217. State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 452, 91 A. 274, 276 (1914).
218. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W. Va. 647, 651, 226 S.E.2d 427, 428 (1976);
accord, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1883); In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir.
1970); In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 227, 358 A.2d 787, 790 (1976) (per curiam).
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essence is penal, intended to redress criminal wrongs by imposing
sentences of imprisonment ... , and proceedings whose purpose is
remedial, intended ... to safeguard the interests of the public by

assuring the continued fitness of attorneys licensed by the jurisdic'219
tion to practice law.
One reason the Fourth Circuit gives for its conclusion in Kolibash
that a disciplinary proceeding is a "civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court" is that such a proceeding is an
"adversary proceeding. '"2 This is, however, a misconception. A disciplinary proceeding is not adversarial in nature because, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explains,
[it] is not a proceeding between two parties where the court is asked to adjudicate
conflicting claims as to some right, corporeal or incorporeal, and where a decision
favorable to one party is necessarily to that extent unfavorable to the other. It
is rather in the nature of an inquest or inquiry as to the conduct of the respondent.

In the result of this inquiry the [bar] association has no interest. It can gain
nothing nor can it lose anything whatever may be the result. It simply calls the
attention of the court to the alleged misconduct of an attorney, not for the purpose
of obtaining redress of any grievance suffered by itself, but only that the court,
if so disposed, may inquire into the charge and act accordingly.Y'

The view that disciplinary proceedings are neither civil actions
nor criminal prosecutions appears to receive the endorsement of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n. 2n In that case the Court stated
that the New Jersey Supreme Court has characterized such proceedings as "neither criminal nor civil in nature.' '223 As authority
for that statement, the Court cited not just a case decided by the
New Jersey Supreme Court but the American Bar Association's
219. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
220. 872 F.2d at 576.
221. Bar Ass'n v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 191, 97 N.E. 751, 753 (1912); accord Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Signer, 558 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Ky. 1977); In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 915-16, 63 S.W.2d
672, 675-76 (1933) (en banc); In re Black, 228 Or. 9, 11, 363 P.2d 206, 207 (1961) (en banc); In re
Little, 40 Wash. 2d 421, 430, 244 P.2d 255, 259 (1952) (en banc). But see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
544, 551 (1968) (for due-process purposes disciplinary proceedings are "adversary proceedings of a
quasi-criminal nature"); Charlton v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Attorney K v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 491 So. 2d 220, 222 (Miss. 1986).
222. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
223. Id.at 433 n.12.
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Standardsfor Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedingsas well,
thereby implying that the characterization is apt generally and not
4
just in New Jersey. 22

In Kolibash the Fourth Circuit failed to give any compelling reason for deviating from this well-established line of authority and,

therefore, failed to justify its conclusion that a disciplinary proceeding is a "civil action or criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the removal statute.

G.

The Inherent Right of Courts to Discipline Their Officers
The decision in Kolibash prevents the Supreme Court of Appeals

of West Virginia from exercising a fundamental right that inheres
in all courts, namely, the right to review the moral fitness of a
member of its bar and to remove him from the rolls if he proves
to be unfit to serve as an officer of the court.
More than a century ago the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized that the "power of removal from the bar is possessed

by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice."

22

More recently, in In re Snyder,2 2 6 the Court reaffirmed that courts

have "an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. ' 227 "This
inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the

224. "The New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that bar disciplinary proceedings are neither
criminal nor civil in nature, but rather are sui generis. In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 358 A.2d 787 (1976).
See also ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DIscn'LN AND DisABltrry PROCEEDINGS § 1.2 (Proposed Draft
1978)." Id. The ABA Standards, as adopted in 1979, provide that "[1]awyer discipline and disability
proceedings are sui generis." ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DiscIPLINE AN DIsABsM PROCEEDINGS
§ 1.2 (1979), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL REsPONrimrrry 375 (T. Morgan & R. Rotunda eds. 1989).
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. is cited for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings are neither
civil nor criminal in Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.) ("The
nature of a disciplinary proceeding is neither civil nor criminal, but an investigation into the conduct
of the lawyer-respondent. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 433 n.12 ... (1982)."), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1081 (1984).
225. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871); accord Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873).
226. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
227. Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
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court which granted admission. ' 228 The Court has also said that the
power of courts "to punish attorneys ... for misbehavior in the
practice of the profession" has been "recognized and enforced ever
since the organization of courts, and the admission of attorneys to
practice therein. If guilty of ... any ...

act of official or personal

dishonesty and oppression, they become subject to the summary

jurisdiction of the court.'

'229

The proposition that any court that has the power to admit attorneys to practice also has the inherent power to discipline and
disbar them appears to have won the universal assent of the nation's
other courts as well. 2 0 The Supreme Court's description of the power
of the courts to conduct disciplinary proceedings as "inherent" indicates clearly that one court cannot lawfully deprive or divest another of this power. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Kolibash
contravened this well-settled principle by disempowering the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to conduct an inquiry into
the fitness of William A. Kolibash to continue to serve as one of
its officers.
It is also well settled that a state supreme court has a right to
inquire into and regulate the unethical conduct of a member of the
228. Id. The Snyder Court cites Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957), in which
the Court says: "[Tihe state judicatures ... have autonomous control over the conduct of their
officers, among whom ... lawyers are included. The court's control over a lawyer's professional life
derives from his relation to the responsibilities of a court." Accord Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F.2d 748,
751 (7th Cir. 1951) ("An attorney is an officer of the court before which he has been admitted to
practice. The power to discipline or disbar such officer for unprofessional conduct is inherent in the
court .... ").

229. Exparte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 374 (1868); accordExparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265,
273 (1883) ("a court has power to exercise a summary jurisdiction over its attorneys ... to punish
them.., for misconduct.., and, in gross cases of misconduct, to strike their names from the roll").
230. E.g., Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1977) ("It is
elementary that any court ... which has the power to admit attorneys to practice has the authority
to disbar or discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct."); In re Rhodes, 370 F.2d 411, 413 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 999 (1967); In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966, 967 n.1 (9th Cir. 1949); In
re Spicer, 126 F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1942); In re Claiborne, 119 F.2d 647, 650 (Ist Cir. 1941);
Laughlin v. Wheat, 95 F.2d 101, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1937); DeKrasner v. Boykin, 54 Ga. App. 29, 35,
186 S.E. 701, 704 (1936) (courts have "necessary incidental power] ... to admit, suspend, discipline,
or disbar an attorney"); In re Roth, 398 Ill.
131, 135, 75 N.E.2d 278, 279-80 (1947) (power to admit
attorneys to bar "implies" power to disbar, which is "inherent" in state supreme court); In re Rudd,
310 Ky. 630, 632, 221 S.W.2d 688, 689 (1949) (per curiam) ("All courts have, as an incident of the
power to admit attorneys to their bar, the power to disbar them ...."); R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert,
504 P.2d 407, 411 (Okla. 1972).
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state bar, even if that conduct has occurred in a federal court rather
than a state court or in a foreign jurisdiction rather than within the
state. In In re Sawyer,231 for example, a member of the territorial
bar of Hawaii was charged by the Hawaii Bar Association, on behalf
of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, with professional misconduct because she had publicly criticized a criminal trial pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii in which she was
an attorney of record. 2 2 The state supreme court suspended her from
its bar for one year, and she appealed. 233 One of the respondent's
arguments on appeal, as paraphrased by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was that "[wihatever [she] did was
none of the business of the territorial court because the conduct
concerned the federal court. ' 23 4 To this argument the court of appeals replied: "But the state (here the territory) is the primary jurisdiction that sponsors a lawyer, that mainly presents him to the
public. It has an interest. Even had the conduct been in open federal

court, still the state has an interest.'

'235

The Supreme Court of New Jersey elaborated further upon the
above reasoning in In re Isserman.2 6 In that case the court disbarred
a New Jersey attorney for contemptuous behavior during a trial in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. 23 7 In replying to the respondent's argument that the supreme
court of his home state should not impose sanctions in excess of
those imposed by the federal court in New York, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey says:
New Jersey is primarily responsible for the respondent's conduct at the bar. He
is not a member of the bar of any other state and he has been permitted to
practice elsewhere solely by virtue of his admission to the bar here. The respondent
must be judged by the standards of practice prevalent here ....
In fairness to
the courts of other jurisdictions and out of a decent respect for the opinion of
the people of this State, we cannot permit a lawyer admitted to practice in New

231. 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).

232. Id.at 191-93.
233. Id. at 196.
234. Id. at 201.

235. Id. (citation omitted).
236. 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953).
237. Id. at 279, 87 A.2d at 907.
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Jersey to do in the courtroom of another jurisdiction what he would never have
been allowed to do here. To do so would bring into disrepute our bar, our bench
and our entire judicial establishment.Y'

Similarly, in Kolibash the state of West Virginia and its Supreme
Court of Appeals have a legitimate interest in disciplining any attorney, including a United States Attorney, who is a member of the
state bar and whose conduct in a United States District Court or
in a case pending in a district court does not meet the ethical standards of the state supreme court and the state bar association. It
was West Virginia that primarily sponsored Kolibash as an attorney,
presented him to the public, and was responsible for his conduct at
the bar. He was licensed to practice in the federal district court by
virtue of being licensed to practice by the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia.
For the state supreme court to allow Kolibash to engage in professional misconduct as United States Attorney would bring both
the bar and the bench of West Virginia into disrepute. West Virginia
and its supreme court had not only an interest in bringing a disciplinary proceeding against Kolibash but an inherent right to determine for themselves whether his conduct as United States Attorney
disqualified him from remaining an officer of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia. Surely it cannot have been Congress's
intention, when enacting the federal-officer removal statute, to permit the federal courts to deny a state and its highest court that
inherent right without any adequate justification for doing so, as
the Fourth Circuit has done in Kolibash.
H.

The Inconsistency of Kolibash with Precedent in the Fourth

Circuit and Other Jurisdictions
In addition to the United States Supreme Court precedents and
other cases already discussed, Kolibash is inconsistent with at least
two significant recent decisions. One case is In re Braverman,2 9 in
238. Id. at 278-79, 87 A.2d at 907. See also Hancock v. Andrews, 161 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.
1947) (acknowledging that "disciplinary action [may be] taken by State Courts against an attorney
for unprofessional conduct in a case pending in the Federal Court").
239. 549 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1976).
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which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit itself recognized
explicitly, both in its holding and in its reliance upon precedent, the
principle of federal-court deference to state regulation of attorney
misconduct. The other case is Waters v. Barr,2 in which the Supreme Court of Nevada persuasively defends the proposition that
United States Attorneys licensed to practice law in Nevada are amenable to being disciplined by the state supreme court.
The issue in In re Braverman was whether the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland had acted improperly in
denying a disbarred attorney's petition for reinstatement as a member of the bar of that court after he had been reinstated as a member
of the state bar by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 241 Because the
district court had not shown "a proper deference to the considered
judgment of the coordinate Maryland Court of Appeals," and because the reasons given by the district court for declining reinstatement were without evidentiary support, the Fourth Circuit reversed
and instructed the district court to readmit Braverman to its bar. 242
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in In re Bravermanrelies extensively
upon a case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
In re Dreier,243 which stands for the general proposition that the
states should take the lead in determining the ethical fitness of members of the bar, and that the federal courts should follow where the
states lead. In re Dreier involved a Pennsylvania attorney convicted
of bribery and other state crimes and subsequently suspended from
the practice of law for one year by a county court.2 4 Four years
later, by which time he was once again a member in good standing
of the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and of the county
bar, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the attorney admission to its bar because of his
criminal recordY5 The Third Circuit reversed the district court's or-

240. 103 Nev. 694, 747 P.2d 900 (1987).
241. 549 F.2d at 913-14.

242. Id. at 921.
243. 258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 68-69.
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der and remanded the case for further proceedings. 246 In In re
Braverman the Fourth Circuit said:
The court [in In re Dreier] had this to say that is especially applicable to Braverman's case:

Under [the rule in this district], and the similar rules in force in
most other federal district courts and in the courts of appeals, reliance
is largely placed by the court upon the courts of the states for determining
the qualifications of persons seeking admission to the bar ....
ITihere
is no federalprocedurefor examining applicantseither as to legal ability
or moral character and so reliance is placed on prior admission to the

bar of a state supreme court.
Certainly an erring lawyer who has been disciplined and ...
has
been rehabilitated and restored to his place at the bar by the court which
knows him best ought not to have what amounts to an order of permanent disbarment entered against him by a federal court solely on the
basis of an earlier criminal record and without regard to his subsequent

rehabilitation.-

In re Dreier thus expresses the view that the federal court should
defer to the decision the state has made concerning whether an attorney is ethically qualified to practice law because the state supreme
court and the state bar, unlike the federal court, have an established
procedure by which to determine an attorney's ethical fitness and
therefore "know him best" in this respect.
Having adopted this view as its own in In re Braverman, the
Fourth Circuit then loses sight of the need for federal-court deference to state regulation of attorney misconduct in Kolibash. As
in In re Dreier and In re Braverman, the state bar association and
the state supreme court in Kolibash had established procedures not
available to the federal court for assessing the moral character of
an attorney and were also much more familiar than the federal court
with the provisions of the state's Code of Professional Responsibility. For these reasons, among others, and for the sake of consistency, the Fourth Circuit should have held in Kolibash, as it did
in In re Braverman, that the state bar and supreme court were in
a better position than the federal district court to decide whether
246. Id. at 70.
247. 549 F.2d at 921 (quoting Braverman, 258 F.2d at 69) (emphasis added).
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an attorney was guilty of professional misconduct and deserving of
discipline.
Although far from being in total agreement with Kolibash, Waters raised the issue of whether the Supreme Court of Nevada had
jurisdiction to bring disciplinary proceedings against Assistant United
States Attorneys who were members of the State Bar of Nevada for
acts they committed while performing their federal duties. 248 The
Waters court held: "There is no question that an attorney may be
subjected to discipline from any bar association to which he is a
member. Thus, this court clearly has jurisdiction to discipline the
Assistant United States attorney who is a member of the State Bar
of Nevada." 249 In addition, the court said:
[T]he fact that Nevada attorneys have been functioning as Assistant United States
attorneys in the federal courts does not insulate them from accountability for
misbehavior if this is performed in Nevada and affects other Nevada attorneys,
or affects the integrity of the State Bar of Nevada, even if the misbehavior in
question is effectuated in whole or in part through activities in the federal
courts ....

... United States attorneys appearing on behalf of the government in the
federal district courts in Nevada are engaged in the practice of law in Nevada.
Further, this state has a compelling interest in regulating the legal profession
within this state. The regulation of the legal profession is a proper exercise of
state power, and that power includes the authority to impose sanctions for any
misconduct of federal prosecutors practicing law within the state ....2

Although Waters was obviously not binding precedent in Kolibash and did not involve interpretation or application of the federalofficer removal statute, the issues considered in the case are closely
enough related to those raised by Kolibash that the Fourth Circuit
might have been expected to take the decision into account. However, the court decided Kolibash without even glancing at Waters.
In its recognition of the important state interest in regulating attorney misconduct and of the inherent right of the state supreme

248. 103 Nev. 694, 695-96, 747 P.2d 900, 901-02 (1987).
249. Id. at 697, 747 P.2d at 902 (citing Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); In re
Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953), judgment set aside on other grounds, 348 U.S. 1 (1954) (per curiam);
In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 622 (1959)).
250. Id. at 697-98, 747 P.2d at 902.
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court and the state bar to bring disciplinary proceedings against any
member of the bar, including a United States Attorney, Waters is
clearly consistent with applicable United States Supreme Court precedents and other authority and thus illustrates the kind of opinion
the Fourth Circuit might have written in Kolibash had the court
chosen to render a decision that was in accordance with well-settled
principles of law.
L The Inconsistency of Kolibash with Practices in Other Federal
Courts
The Fourth Circuit's assumption in Kolibash that a state bar
association and a state supreme court cannot be trusted to determine
fairly and accurately whether a United States Attorney has engaged
in professional misconduct is not shared by other federal courts.
This is evident in the fact that the federal courts commonly refer,
or express their willingness to refer, charges of misconduct on the
part of federal prosecutors to state-bar ethics committees for adjudication.
For example, in United States v. Kelly, 25' an Assistant United
States Attorney was accused of egregious misconduct, including the
intentional solicitation of false testimony and reliance upon it at
trial.25 2 The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that "the public interest requires

. . .

that ...

the matter of former Assistant U. S. Attorney Lloyd Macdonald's
conduct be referred to the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
to assess the need for disciplinary proceedings."253 Similarly, in Ramos Colon v. United States Attorney,254 in which a United States
Attorney was accused of acting in bad faith in prosecuting a defendant for his political beliefs, knowing that the government had
insufficient evidence to convict, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit recognized that one of the "sanctions available
251.
252.
253.
254.

543 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Mass.), supplemented, 550 F. Supp. 901 (D. Mass. 1982).
543 F. Supp. at 1304.
Id. at 1314.
576 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978).
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to the district court" was "reporting the misconduct to the appro255
priate professional association. '
Kolibash is clearly at odds with decisions such as Kelly and Ramos Colon, which rest upon the assumption, not that the state bar
associations and supreme courts pose a threat of harassment or biased adjudication to federal prosecutors, but that these state agencies
can, at least in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be relied
upon to conduct disciplinary proceedings in a responsible and impartial manner and to reach fair decisions, whether the lawyers
charged with misconduct are private practitioners or United States
Attorneys.
256
The premise of Kelly, Ramos Colon, and countless other cases
is that "the United States Attorney and his aides are not privileged
characters, but are subject to precisely the same rules and penalties,
and to the same summary jurisdiction, as other members of the
bar.''257 The locus classicus of the idea expressed by the foregoing
premise is United States v. Maresca,258 in which Judge Hough of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made the following
famous statement concerning the status of United States Attorneys
vis-a-vis other members of the bar:
Whenever an officer of the court has in his possession or under his control
books or papers, or ... any other articles in which the court has official interest,
and of which any person . . . has been unlawfully deprived, that person may
petition the court for restitution. This I take to be an elementary principle, depending upon the inherent disciplinary power of any court of record.
Attorneys are officers of the court, and the United States attorney does not
by taking office escape from this species of professional discipline. Thus power
to entertain this motion depends on the fact that the party proceeded against is
an attorney, not that he is an official known as the United States attorney.Y9

This passage, which has been cited with approval by a great many
courts, 260 including the Supreme Court of the United States 26' and
255. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
256. See supra note 138.
257. In re Sylvester, 41 F.2d 231, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
258. 266 F. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
259. Id. at 717.
260. E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff'd sub.
nom. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165, 168-69
(2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.); In re Sylvester, 41 F.2d at 236.
261. Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 225 (1929) (Brandeis, J.).
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the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 262 expresses the generally prevailing view that United States Attorneys are subject to
the same disciplinary procedures and sanctions as other members of
the bar. The Kolibash decision, which exempts a United States Attorney from the state-bar disciplinary proceedings to which all other
members of the West Virginia bar are subject, is plainly an aberration.
III.

TmB

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS MILITATING AGAINST THE

KOLIBASH DECISION

The Kolibash decision is not only inconsistent with applicable
law but unwise from the standpoint of policy. In the first place,
the decision is likely to promote inconsistency between federal courts
and state supreme courts with regard to the way in which they adjudicate professional-misconduct cases. In a concurring opinion in
In re Abrams,263 Judge Rosenn of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explains why consistency between the
federal and state courts is desirable in such cases:
A[n] ... important policy behind the need to avoid disparate sanctions by
the federal and state courts is the maintenance of public confidence in our legal

system and in the bar. Disbarment is designed to protect the public. The district
court's action [in disbarring Abrams after the Supreme Court of New Jersey had

merely suspended him from practice for one year] permits Abrams to practice in
the state, but not the federal, system. Such an anomaly can only lead to confusion

in the minds of the public, which justifiably may speculate why an attorney not
qualified to practice in a federal court has sufficient moral character to practice
in the state court. Unless an exceptional reason of record justifies such disparate
treatment, its effect will, in my opinion, render a grave disservice to the public.:"

Presumably mindful of such considerations, the Supreme Court of
the United States has said that in order to ensure consistency in this
area, the federal courts should, in the absence of compelling reasons
to do otherwise, conform their decisions in cases of professional
misconduct to the decisions made by the states.

262. Austin v. United States, 297 F.2d 356, 358 n.2 (4th Cir. 1961).
263. 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038 (1975).
264. 521 F.2d at 1106 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted).
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In In re Isserman,265 for example, the Court said: "[T]his Court
will, in the absence of some grave reason to the contrary, follow
the finding of the state that the character requisite for membership
in the bar is lacking. ' 266 But consistency is not likely to be achieved
if the federal courts take it upon themselves to make decisions in
disciplinary cases that are entirely independent of those made by the
states. As Chief Judge Kaufman of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland has recently said in a closely related
context,
unless some very strong need is present, a federal district court should not establish
independent procedures and mechanisms to investigate the private and professional
character of applicants for admission to the bar of its court but should rely on
the procedures and mechanisms which have been adopted by the highest court
of the state, working in conjunction with and in review of the lower state courts
and the state bar associations. To do otherwise would cause exactly the confusion
7
which Judge Rosenn referred to in his concurring opinion in In re Abrams.2

To allow the federal district courts of a state, as Kolibash did,
to establish independent procedures for deciding whether United
States Attorneys have violated the state bar's code of professional
ethics, while the state bar association and the state supreme court
apply that same code in cases involving all other attorneys, is to
invite inconsistency of interpretation and application of the state's
standards and unequal treatment of attorneys across cases that are
similar with respect to the professional misconduct that has been
committed. Consistency is difficult enough to achieve when the only
problem to be resolved is whether the federal court should or should
not abide by prior disciplinary decisions made by the state supreme
court. When the federal court is charged with making the initial
application of state ethics standards in some cases and the state
system with doing so in other cases, the consistency problem is exacerbated. The problem then becomes one of coordinating the decisions of two independent tribunals, neither of which is necessarily
even aware of what the other has done or is doing in similar cases.
265.
266.
267.
745 F.2d

345 U.S. 286 (1953).
Id. at 288 (citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917)).
In re G.L.S., 586 F. Supp. 375, 381 (D. Md.) (dissenting opinion) (citation omitted), aff'd,
856 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Once again, the Fourth Circuit's lack of concern in Kolibash
about potential problems of inconsistency between state and federal
decision making is puzzling and ironic in light of the court's recognition in In re Braverman of the importance of "symmetry in the
standards of qualification of coordinate courts in the same state
..

2"268

In addition, in the latter case the court quotes with ap-

proval the portion of Judge Rosenn's concurring opinion in In re
Abrams that explains why consistency is important from a policy
standpoint.2 69 Because the Fourth Circuit was aware in In re Braverman of the need to achieve consistency between state and federal
sanctions in any particular case, it is difficult to understand how it
could later fail to perceive that its decision in Kolibash was likely
to give rise to a different but related type of inconsistency, namely,
inconsistency between the way in which a particular kind of professional misconduct is dealt with by the federal district court when
it has been committed by a federal prosecutor and the way in which
that same kind of misconduct is dealt with by the state system when
it has been committed by an attorney who is not a federal officer.
To extend the argument Judge Rosenn made in In re Abrams,
it is plainly a disservice to members of the public to place them in
the position of having to wonder why one attorney who has engaged
in a particular variety of misconduct has been disbarred and another
guilty of the same misconduct has not. Moreover, it is an injustice
to members of the bar to allow similarly situated attorneys to receive
widely disparate sanctions. The Fourth Circuit could have minimized
the chances that such problems would arise by holding in Kolibash
that all disciplinary proceedings brought for the purpose of determining an attorney's fitness to remain a member of the West Virginia bar must be conducted by a single agency, the state bar
association, acting under the authority of the state supreme court.
Judge Rosenn's concurrence in In re Abrams called attention to
a second important policy consideration that is poorly served by the
Kolibash decision. The judge said:

268. 549 F.2d at 914.
269. Id. at 921 (quoting In re Abrams, 521 F.2d at 1106 (concurring opinion)).
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The imposition of disbarment by the federal court when the state has imposed

only suspension implicitly attacks the regularity and judgmental values of the state
proceedings, implying that the sanction chosen by the state courts is inappropriate.

This result is bound to create tensions between the state and federal judiciariesY'

Judge Rosenn is obviously referring here to cases in which the federal and state courts impose different sanctions on an attorney for
the same misconduct. Judge Rosenn's reasoning is equally applicable, however, to cases in which the sanction imposed on a United
States Attorney by the federal court for a particular kind of ethical
infraction differs from the sanction imposed on a state prosecutor
or a private attorney by the state supreme court for similar misconduct. If a federal district court following Kolibash were to reach
a decision, in a disciplinary case involving a federal attorney, that
was inconsistent with a decision made by the state supreme court
in a similar case or with the decision the state court would have
made in the same case, the tensions of which Judge Rosenn speaks
might easily arise between the state and federal judiciaries.
A third policy consideration that casts doubt on the desirability
of Kolibash is that the decision places responsibility for adjudicating
a case involving charges of attorney misconduct in the hands of a
tribunal that has had little, if any, experience deciding such cases
and consequently lacks the expertise necessary to do so judiciously.
From a policy standpoint it would obviously be preferable to entrust
this responsibility to the state bar association and the state supreme
court, which are much more familiar with the state's rules of professional conduct, applicable precedent, customary sanctions, and
other considerations that should inform decision making in such
cases. 27' Concerning the analogous question of whether state criminal
prosecutions should be removed to federal court, "[s]ome courts
argue that unfamiliarity with state criminal law is [a] reason to limit
removal of state prosecutions." 272 This argument obviously applies
to removal of state-bar disciplinary proceedings as well.
270. 521 F.2d at 1105-06 (concurring opinion).
271. See supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text.
272. Note, supra note 16, at 1107 n.58. As an example, the author of the Note cites California
v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989), in which the court of appeals
points out that "[u]nder the diversity jurisdiction, federal courts have long entertained civil suits
turning solely on state substantive law," implying thereby that the same is not true of criminal prosecutions. Id.
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A fourth policy consideration that militates against construing
the removal statute to allow removal of disciplinary proceedings
brought against federal attorneys is that such a construction adds
unnecessarily to the already burdensome caseload of the federal district courts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cites a
similar "practical consideration[]" as one of the grounds for its
decision in California v. Mesa, which the United States Supreme
Court later affirmed:
Congress could not have intended 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) to turn the federal courts
into a special traffic court for federal employees. Whatever remote federal interests
are implicated by state traffic regulation of postal vehicles, the overcrowded district courts do not need a new category of pesky cases turning solely on state
law.-

By the same token, because the federal interests that are implicated
by state regulation of attorney misconduct are "remote," and statebar disciplinary proceedings brought against federal officers turn
solely on the state code of professional ethics, there is every reason
to assume that Congress did not intend to increase the already heavy
burdens of the federal courts by having them serve, pursuant to the
removal statute, as special disciplinary tribunals for United States
Attorneys.
As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said, the
purpose that Congress had in view when it enacted the federal-officer
removal statute and its predecessors was to prevent the paralysis of
the federal government by state courts hostile to federal authority.
Removal of the Kolibash disciplinary proceeding simply does not
serve that purpose.
In the first place, Kolibash made no showing or allegation of
state hostility to federal authority. Once again, the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Mesa is equally applicable to Kolibash. Although a
concern about state prejudice against federal interests might be
"compelling in the context of civil rights law or some realm of
federal authority likely to encounter antagonism in state court, [t]here
is simply no reason to believe" that federal prosecutors charged with
273. 813 F.2d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989).
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ethics violations "will not get a fair shake in state court." 274 Second,
a disciplinary proceeding is neither a civil action nor a criminal prosecution and thus is not the sort of proceeding that Congress regarded
as a potential threat to the enforcement of federal law when it enacted the statute. Third, since the Supreme Court and other courts
have said that federal prosecutorial immunity to state-bar disciplinary proceedings does not exist, United States Attorney Kolibash
did not and could not aver a colorable federal defense to the disciplinary proceeding brought against him. In this crucial respect Kolibash differs from the cases with which Congress was concerned
when it enacted the removal statute. For all of the foregoing reasons,
the substantial federal interests that federal-officer removal was intended to protect do not come into play in Kolibash.
Judicial interpretation of the federal-officer removal statute inevitably involves the striking of a "delicate balance between federal
and state interests. "275 Whereas the federal interests at stake in Kolibash were extremely attenuated, the state interests were very substantial. At issue for West Virginia was the traditional prerogative
of the state to protect the public against attorney misconduct and
the inherent authority of the state supreme court to inquire, with
the assistance of the state bar association, into the ethical fitness of
one of its officers and to discipline or disbar him if necessary. As
Congress and the United States Supreme Court have long recognized, these state interests, like the state interest in the regulation
of crime, go to the heart of state sovereignty and, therefore, deserve
deference from the federal government.
In Californiav. Mesa the Ninth Circuit weighed the competing
state and federal interests and concluded that "[tihe attenuated federal interest in ensuring that [the] trial- [of the postal workers] be
unbiased does not justify an invasion of the state's authority to
police its streets.' '276 Since the federal interests implicated in Kolibash
were just as trivial as those in Mesa, and the state interests were
just as significant, the Fourth Circuit should have held in Kolibash,
274. 813 F.2d at 966-67 (citations omitted).

275. Id. at 964.
276. Id. at 965.
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as the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court did in Mesa, that removal of the state proceeding to federal court was not authorized
by the statute.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had

no legal authority to decide Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics
on the merits in the first place because the district court's remand
of the Kolibash disciplinary proceeding to the state system was implicitly grounded in jurisdictional concerns and was therefore unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Moreover, the court of appeals
had no legal authority on which to base the decision it reached in
the case. On the contrary, Kolibash is in direct conflict with the
holdings and reasoning of a number of United States Supreme Court
precedents that interpret the federal-officer removal statute and with
a substantial corpus of other applicable authority. The decision is
not only unjustifiable as a matter of law but also undesirable as a
matter of policy, and is therefore, clearly erroneous.
In short, Judge Wilkinson's opinion in Kolibash has already done
considerable harm to the legitimate interests of the state of West
Virginia, its supreme court, and its bar. In order to prevent Kolibash
from causing further harm, and in order to remove its taint from
the law of the Fourth Circuit, the court of appeals should now
acknowledge its errors and should overrule the decision as expeditiously as possible.
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